Hi Walter, Let me know if the following question and thoughts make any sense. What if by 'simples' we take W. to also have had 'concepts' in mind, despite the context where he's trying to give them (concepts) a simple linguistic form so as to represent them on paper? Maybe there is a similar strategy going on in Fodor such that without some form of conceptual atomism, there might be too much trouble for an adequate science of psychology. The thought that we are always using them (simples) sounds like an abductive inference from the problem about holism, i.e., if holism is true, it would make it appear difficult to explain how we ever understood each other ('s concepts). If at some point you can comment on the paper referenced, I would be thankful for your thoughts on it. Ref. Jerry A. Fodor, Having concepts: A brief refutation of the ...Jan 28, 2009 ... Jerry A. Fodor (2004). Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47. ... philpapers.org/rec/FODHCA - Cached - Similar. Budd --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <calhorn@...> wrote: > > That's a very good question, Ron. > > As I've said, I think W's argument for simples is as audacious as any >philosophical argument I've ever heard. Maybe I could swallow an argument >that >concludes that they (like Leibniz's monads) must exist. But W says that we >have > >to use them constantly since otherwise we'd understand nothing. Everything we >believe (not just know) requires us to constantly utilize them, and yet >somehow.....nobody can give an example of one. > > > Walto > > --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@> wrote: > > > > Hi Walter: > > Â > > If ostensive definition can apply only to elementary propositions, how can > > it > >be that we have no examples of elementary propositions? > > Â > > Thanks, > > --Ron