[quickphilosophy] 1.21 Continued

  • From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2010 09:01:00 -0700 (PDT)

 How are we able to have a distinction or any kind of relationship 
between "the constituents of thought" and "objects in the world" without 
reference to the questions that are raised about realism and idealism? 
Is such a distinction possible?

I've heard more convincing arguments than "because they must".

On 21/07/2010 00:01, walto wrote:
>
>
> 1.21 Each can be the case or not be the case and all else stay the same.
>
> 6. In his correspondence with Russell, W says that though he may not
> know WHAT the constituents of thought are or HOW they correspond with
> objects in the world, he knows THAT they do have constituents that
> correspond to the objects occurring in facts. Why? Because they MUST.
> [Ansc. at 28]


      

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