[quickphilosophy] Re: 1.12; 1.13; 1.2 & 1.21

  • From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 07 Sep 2010 17:09:51 -0000

--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Martin Brampton <martin.lists@...> 
wrote:
>
> Not really, an explanation that relies on the terms to be explained is 
> just not effective as an explanation.  No need to go to extremes.
> 
> 
> On 07/09/10 14:08, walto wrote:
> >
> > --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > <mailto:quickphilosophy%40yahoogroups.com>, Martin Brampton
> > <martin.lists@> wrote:
> >  >
> >  > Circularity undermines explanations just as much as arguments.
> >  >
> >
> > Only for foundationalists.
> >
> > W
>

My point was that for the non-foundationalist, all explanations are, in the 
end, (at least partially) circular.  IMO, there is no outside vantage from 
which one can make a case for a realist theory of truth.  If you don't think 
that statements are made true by facts, I don't believe there are any 
"arguments" that are likely to convince you.  

In any case, if nobody has anything to add either about the Fodor paper or in 
answer to Martin's questions, I propose we move on to the McTaggart (120-page) 
booklet on immortality, which is available in full view at googlebooks. 
Martin's remarks are a good segue here, I think, because of McTaggart's 
(non-absolutist) idealism.

I volunteer to lead the discussion of the (somewhat Berkeleyan) section 
involving philosophy of perception (roughly pages 26-60).  Anybody else?

W




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