[Wittrs] Re: reducing your toothache

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 10:06:49 -0700 (PDT)

--- On Wed, 3/24/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> You see Dennett's frequent mentions of, and discussions
> about, our experiences as "paying lip service" whereas I do
> not. How is it to "pay lip service" to talk about things

If he did not merely pay lip-service to the idea of intentionality then he 
would grant, as does Searle, that people actually have something called 
intentionality. Likewise, instead of attempting to "quine qualia" he would 
grant that people actually have direct contact with their experiences. Dennett 
runs away from these ideas. Apparently the subjective aspect of reality scares 
the dickens out of him.

Like many materialists, he's afraid of the mental because he's inherited the 
Cartesian categories and can't see past them. Nor can you, as your argument 
below illustrates.

>> Searle, by contrast, preserves the subjective ontology
> of mental phenomena and does only a causal reduction. He
> isn't afraid to affirm  the ontological reality of the
> mental qua mental. 
> A Cartesian move, for sure, while you think Dennett's
> denial of the special and  separate nature of the
> "mental" to be an affirmation of what it denies!
> >He understands that only a dualist would recognize that
> category as distinct from the material in the first place. 
> >
> And Searle thereby falls into self-contradiction 

No, it is absolutely not a "cartesian move" to affirm the ontological reality 
of the subjective! Only someone who accepted the Cartesian categories would 
think so.

> (the CRA implies what he expressly denies when discussing brains)

Perhaps you should pay attention what he actually says.


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