A. Logic's meaning of 'meaning'. There is a notion that a sign carries a sort of atmosphere around with it. But even if a sign does carry some sort of halo or cloud (The notion is very vague), this halo is not the sign's meaning -- since it is not what is meant by the word 'meaning' in Wittgenstein's logic. Logic is only concerned with the meaning of a sign that is given in public rules (conventions) for using the sign. For the same reason, any mental image or idea that a sign may evoke is not the sign's meaning.Second, while it is true that in many cases a sign-for-sign substitution rule will not be of any help to us, that does not preclude there being other techniques for giving explanations of meaning. Rules of grammar take various forms (as described in Types of Definition). Wittgenstein's logic gives alternative methods of definition. Thus, for instance, we can describe a game children play with blocks of wood and correspondingly shaped holes; "Here," we say as we hand the child a block, "find a square space for this one"; and so on. This is an example of what Wittgenstein called a 'language-game'. This game reminds us of one use we make of the word 'space'. It is an example of a non-substitution technique for giving an explanation of meaning. It is a partial answer to the questions: how do we learn to use a particular sign, and how would we teach someone else to use it?By exclusively demanding sign-for-sign definitions of words, our English teachers mislead their students. A child's natural response when asked for the meaning of a word is to say, "Oh, that's like when ..." -- i.e. the child points to examples from our life. The child, unlike the English teacher, has understood the logic of our language.http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt3.html