[Wittrs] Re: Who lost to Deep Blue?

  • From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 19:33:13 -0000

Hi Josh,

Your responses are brilliant in that I can tell you have enough command of the 
issues to warrant such a compliment.

I see why earlier, though, I thought you completely lacked any command at all!  
And guess why?  It's because you are so bald!

I refer you to my reply to Neil today.

I simply see weak AI and Searlean biological naturalism as noncompeting 
research programs.

Wanna debate this?

Looks like you might.

For example, you write:

> I'm dubious about semantics, but you know what I do like?  Intentionality!  
> Though I'm sure you won't like the (deflated) intentionality that I like.<

Prolly not because you speak with forked tongue.  You can't be dubious about 
semantics given your successful speech act about what you like, compared to 
what you don't like, as well as what you don't admittedly know the meaning of 
(semantics, syntax), as you earlier pointed out a bout of skepticism about.

Now, if you want your deflated sense of intentionality such that thermostats 
are intentional systems, then you might end up with a research program that is 
not necessarily about philosophy of mind per se.  It would be about how to get 
artifacts to behave via computer programs.  That's fine.  Searle doesn't argue 
against that research program.

If you want, though, you may argue some incoherence in Searle.

But to do that, you can't be so breazy while demanding an exacting lucidity.

I had no idea that Stuart was inspired by your baldness to offer detailed 
reasons for the baldness!

Two questions:

1.  Can computation be discovered to be a physical process?

2.  Is it assigned willy nilly?

One could answer 'no' to the first and 'no' to the second without courting 

How about other possibilities like 'yes' and 'yes', 'no' and 'yes', as well as 
'yes' and 'no'?


--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> >
> > I will briefly reply to both Josh and Gordon below.
> >
> >
> > --- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> > >
> > > --- On Fri, 3/19/10, jrstern <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Can you show us who ever said syntax *is* either
> > > > constitutive or sufficient for semantics?
> > >
> > > Stuart seems to think it is.
> >
> > Anyone willing to fudge efficient causality with computation is one who may 
> > think syntax may be sufficient for semantics.  Most don't come out as 
> > baldly as Stuart.
> Well that would be me, not Stuart.
> But I'm not sure what you (or anyone) mean by syntax, or semantics.
> I'm pretty clear on causality, but only by disclaiming Humean skepticism.  
> And I'm very clear on computation, though nobody else is.
> > Stuart simply and openly conflates computation with physics and doesn't 
> > understand that it is a fudge to baldly state the premise that "Computers 
> > are physical machines."
> Again, that would be me.  I believe Stuart actually qualifies all of these 
> statements.  I support them pretty much straight on.
> > The fudge-fest way is one way of implying it without being explicit about 
> > it.
> Please, make it explicit, I support explicit.
> Do you have a response, if these are stated explicitly, other than outright 
> rejection by appealing to Searle quotations as final authority - no matter 
> how much they are inconsistent or incoherent by my lights?
> >  See below on a certain baldness in Dennett.  Indeed, content similarity is 
> > all one gets with parallel processing a la Dennett plus Paul Churchland.  
> > But it is shown that it can't do the work of content identity by Fodor in 
> > "All at Sea in Semantic Space:  Churchland on Meaning Similarity."
> http://olddavidhume.rutgers.edu/tech_rpt/MeaningSim46.PDF
> There are about nine issues here, but I don't see how they relate.
> >  But it is also difficult to make content identity metaphysically 
> > respectable nowadays.  So be it.  There is still much trouble for the other 
> > side too.  Externalism may appear to some to imply that one's iphone is 
> > literally part of their mind.  "Supersizing the Mind" and Fodor's 
> > review--google this and see what the famously funny Fodor has to say on 
> > this topic just for fun.
> Ditto.
> http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n03/jerry-fodor/where-is-my-mind
> I like Fodor's internalism, which he calls Cartesianism, either not meaning 
> dualism or embracing dualism, I'm not quite certain which.
> But I don't think Fodor has ever been entirely happy with computation, in 
> part because he has never understood it, never simply tried to make all the 
> physicalist basis for it explicit and sufficient.  He derides the Churchlands 
> for trying to do so, but they famously try to do so only by avoiding the 
> Turing model of computation and the "symbolic" approaches to computation, 
> IMHO again "fudging" the basic issues.
> > Funny enough, it turns out that Dennett baldly (well, maybe considerably 
> > late in the pages of _Consciousness Explained_) dismisses the second 
> > premise.  Cf.  Searle's review of Dennett.
> None of them are beyond debate.
> > I suppose that such baldness is treated as philosophical anathema for those 
> > who aren't so Wittgensteinian that their philosophy is expressed as a sort 
> > of joke with breezy airs of seriousness.  This just may account for a very 
> > bold title of one of Fodor's more recent papers:  "Having Thoughts:  A 
> > Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century."
> http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/mindsandmachines/Papers/havingconcepts.pdf
> I cannot quite follow what you are saying about this.
> I'm afraid I completely part company with Fodor here, and also in his latest 
> book, LOT 2, where he says that "procedural semantics" are the worst thing in 
> the world.
> Well, if one is going to believe as I do in computation as physical and 
> causal, and if one is going to DISBELIEVE as I do in Fodor's innateness of 
> ideas (like 'horse' and 'carburetor'), then what turns out to work, is pretty 
> much just the kind of "procedural semantics" as Fodor disclaims in the book 
> and in this article.  Jerry, if computers are going to turn out to be useful 
> devices in this world, even as computers and not as minds, some account has 
> to be given of how that happens.  And if that account just also happens to 
> completely vitiate Searle's idea of what computation is, well, so much the 
> worse for Searle, unless you can wish away the billion or so computer 
> workstations, not to mention smart phones and the like, that we all seem so 
> attached to these days.
> > Further, I wonder if anybody ever thought to create an analogue of the CR 
> > by calling something the HR (human room).  We put an humunculus inside the 
> > HR and, lo, the poor guy can't make heads or tails out of brute physical 
> > happenings such that physics also is insufficient for semantics!
> And so much for that HR story.
> Or so much for semantics.
> I'm dubious about semantics, but you know what I do like?  Intentionality!  
> Though I'm sure you won't like the (deflated) intentionality that I like.
> > Pretend that even the reader doesn't know a language, though, for it to 
> > work!
> I am playing with an English Room (ER) in which a speaker of English is given 
> questions in writing, and responds to them.
> > Happy spring March madness!
> None of my local schools nor alma mater are in it this year, so what the heck.
> Go Lakers!
> Josh
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