--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > Perhaps you don't understand that if computationalism = false then > strong AI = false. Whatever that means. I worded my comment in terms of computationalism, because I don't rule out the possibility that people might someday try to construct an artificially intelligent system in some other way (i.e. not based on computation). I prefer to wait until I see such alternative methods before I make any judgement on whether they are likely to succeed. > Searle only gives weak AI the benefit of the doubt when ... And that's where Searle's thinking goes wrong. He should have had the courage to disagree with the possibility of weak AI, instead of inventing his own mystical version (i.e. his "strong AI"). Searle elsewhere (I think the Scientific American article) says that intentionality is due to the causal powers of the brain. The Systems Reply is really just saying the same thing. That is, the only way to get the behavior right is to get the causal powers right, and therefore if the system achieves weak AI (i.e. gets the behavior right), it will also have achieved intentionality by virtue of having those causal powers. Searle's "response" to the Systems reply does not even address that essential point. > And by the way thought experiments can contain anything logically > conceivable. And they can produce bullshit conclusions. > We can conceive of a Searle with a brain large enough and powerful > enough to internalize and operate the program and pass the TT. I can conceive of Chalmers zombies. I can conceive of immaterial substances. These sorts of arguments are worthless. The value of thought experiments is in helping people construct suitable concepts to allow for discussion. But such thought experiments by themselves cannot constitute proofs. Regards, Neil ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/