[Wittrs] Re: The Epiphenomenalism of Dennett viz Fodor
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2010 23:05:56 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@> wrote:
> >
> > The problem for Jerry Fodor is that he sees intentionality as very
> > important. Yet his view of how the mind works (as discussed in his
> > "Methodological Solipsism" paper and in his "Modularity of Mind"
> > book does not actually depend on original intentionality at all.
> > So he has to be either epiphenomenalist or mystical about
> > intentionality.
>
> Or reductionist.
>
>
> > I reject
> > the extreme representationalism of AI and of Fodor.
>
> Me, too.
>
> Yet, I continue to find values in both.
>
> Fodor says, "no computation without representation", but I believe
> that is wrong. Certainly, neural networks compute, purportedly
> without representation.
>
> And (my topic of the week) Rorty too rejects the idea of mind
> (or philosophy) as a mirror of nature, in that he is (apparently)
> more instrumentalist about it all. I need to reread him before
> saying more.
Rorty mentions that debates in phil. of mind have a tendency to become
scholastic quibbles over word-use/meaning.. Rorty was also a confessed
eliminativist while also thinking that philosophy ought to become more a matter
of something other than truth, whether this is true or desirable
notwithstanding..
>
> I think the case is that representation is often available and
> convenient, but never necessary, in any sense of the term.
Then presumably you might like Armstrong's distinction between perception and
perceptual experience such that perception may happen without perceptual
experience. One can have a theory of intentionality, like Searle, without
giving up the thesis that all perceptions are perceptual experiences--one can
even be a direct realist without making Armstrong's distinction. See Searle's
response to Armstrong in _John Searle and His Critics_.
>
> In which case, it is a project to revise Fodor in the light of
> the contingent nature of representation.
>
> Josh
Fodor puts everyone here to shame, philosophically if not really. One of his
newer books is _Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong_ (correct me if I
got the title incorrect). Also have a look at his paper, if you can find it,
"Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century," presumably
based on his book. Correct me if I'm wrong. So, a project.
From Wiki:
Fodor's criticism of Dennett:
Fodor starts with some criticisms of so-called standard realism. This view is
characterized, according to Fodor, by two distinct assertions. One of these
regards the internal structure of mental states and asserts that such states
are non-relational. The other concerns the semantic theory of mental content
and asserts that there is an isomorphism between the causal roles of such
contents and the inferential web of beliefs. Among modern philosophers of mind,
the majority view seems to be that the first of these two assertions is false,
but that the second is true. Fodor departs from this view in accepting the
truth of the first thesis but rejecting strongly the truth of the second.[15]
In particular, Fodor criticizes the instrumentalism of Daniel Dennett.[15]
Dennett maintains that it is possible to be realist with regard to intentional
states without having to commit oneself to the reality of mental
representations.[16] Now, according to Fodor, if one remains at this level of
analysis, then there is no possibility of explaining why the intentional
strategy works:
"There is...a standard objection to instrumentalism...: it is difficult to
explain why the psychology of beliefs/desires works so well, if the psychology
of beliefs/desires is, in fact, false....As Putnam, Boyd and others have
emphasized, from the predictive successes of a theory to the truth of that
theory there is surely a presumed inference; and this is even more likely
when... we are dealing with the only theory in play which is predictively
crowned with success. It is not obvious...why such a presumption should not
militate in favour of a realist conception...of the interpretations of
beliefs/desires."[17]
Budd
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