[Wittrs] Re: The CRA in Symbolic Form (According to Joe)
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 11:57:55 -0000
A few comments:
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> it seems that I neglected to explain something about the conventions of
> my notation. consider this line.
>
> [7] Ua {1, 4}
>
> the numbers in the [square brackets] are just step numbers. they allow
> me to reference a proposition by the step number of the line at which it
> appears.
>
> the numbers in the {curly braces} represent the assumptions that have
> been used to support the proposition stated to their left. so, Ua, the
> proposition stated at [7] rests on the assumptions stated at [1] and
> [4].
>
This is useful as I took the curly brackets to indicate the relation to the
original three premise argument provided by Searle.
> keeping track of the assumptions made shows which ones are working and
> when; but, more importantly, they show that when the conclusion is
> reached at [28], it only rests on [1], [2] and [3], which correspond to
> the three axioms of the CRA.
>
> * * *
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >I accept your usages though I question why you think it necessary to
> >introduce different terms for "constituting semantic understanding" for
> >instance and "constituting minds" since theoretically the same
> >constitutive relation obtains.
>
> this redundancy stems from accepting the second axiom as stated rather
> than 'as argued'.
>
> the second argument
You mean the "second axiom"?
> is stated as a simple predicate, a mind has semantic
> understanding, which makes having semantic understanding a necessary
> condition for being a mind. 'as argued', semantic understanding is also
> a sufficient condition for being a mind. think of Searle's statements to
> the effect that if an alien showed up and convinced us it was conscious,
> we'd agree that it had a mind even though it had green slime instead of
> a brain.
>
Does not seem something I'd dispute. But then there's no apparent reason to
have two different notations to represent the different causal and constitutive
relations.
> if I had explicitized this assumption, the second axiom would become a
> biconditional (M -> S & S -> M); and, it would follow that what
> constituted a mind also constituted semantic understanding and vice
> versa.
>
> it was a trade-off. I stayed with the literal meaning of the second
> axiom; but, ended up with a longer proof.
>
A much longer proof! One wonders why Searle, who set this up, thought a shorter
one (three premises and a number of conclusions) was enough, eh? But I think
Neil is right about the fact that the formal nature of it 1) leads to
obscurantizing the issue (something Searle presumably wanted to avoid) and 2)
the result of relying on a formal manipulation of symbols to mask the lack of
truth in a given semantic claim.
Note that when I converted Searle's proof to a notational representation, I
aimed to keep it as simple as possible so we could see the implications.
Turning it into a 28 step "proof" with all sorts of back and forth references
and notational translations of the ordinary language in which it was originally
made does more to mask the issues than to reveal them. I stopped after a time
for a reason -- it was taking me hours to translate what you had done when I
had other things demanding my attention. Philosophy does sometimes require
complexity (even at this level) but all too often such complexity does more to
obscure than to clarify.
> >Here you have wrung out the prior ambiguity in Searle's terms. However,
> >what you give us is stipulative, i.e., we need to know what its basis
> >for being deemed true is other than an agreement to accept it for
> >argument's sake.
>
> yes, you *do* need this; but, you will *never* get that from a formal
> proof --- which is entirely syntactic, just as Neil indicated.
>
But the point is not that the formal proof wouldn't work if all its terms were
correctly in place. It's that it doesn't because of a couple of problems:
1) The third premise as Searle gives it to us slips back and forth between
meanings;
2) But if it didn't, then it would not prove its conclusions unless each of the
underlying claims are true.
As you know, I believe I have shown that Searle does introduce an equivocation
which can be removed (which you did). But then it is still not going to work
unless the removal of the equivocated term(s) leads to replacement with true
claims that work in the same way. Thus, we don't need 28 steps to replace
Searle's 3 step proof. The three will do if they are all true. But the third
premise, read as a causal claim, is not manifestly (there's that word again)
true.
There are some who do think it is but not for reasons in the proof but because
it represents a way of understanding what they think "consciousness" (and
"understanding") mean, namely that it is irreducible, i.e., that the failure to
find consciousness in the CR is due to the absence of some constituent element
that is conscious (has the property of being conscious).
But that is NOT the only way of conceiving consciousness and, in fact, it is
arguable that it is wrong because
1) there is at least one other alternative (that consciousness is a system
level function or property) and
2) the idea that consciousness is ontologically basic implies dualism which
brings with it a whole host of other problems, not least of which the
requirement that we add factors to the idea we have of the universe to explain
it JUST TO ACCOUNT FOR THE PRESENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN IT.
While this last might be justified if the facts showed no other explanation
would work, they don't show that (given #1 and because to do so is to
unnecessarily violate a time-tested rule of scientific explanation: Occam's
Razor).
So the argument offered here is that when you wring out the equivocation from
the third premise, you are left with an unestablished claim that some believe
and some don't. Hence the argument that depends on it depends on one's belief
in that claim's truth in which case we need a second argument for that claim's
truth.
Those who profess to believe it hold that the CR demonstrates its truth but
that begs the question since I've already shown why it doesn't (there is at
least one other alternative reading that makes sense, etc.). What then happens
is those who believe the CR shows the truth of the third premise fall back on
the positions that it is self-evident, which brings us back, full circle to the
equivocation since the self-evidence or conceptual truth involved ONLY applies
to the non-identity reading which has already been disvowed.
> any argument as to whether the third axiom is or is not true is a
> separate argument.
Precisely.
> it requires understanding what the syntax is about.
No, THAT is the assumption, i.e., the belief that to be conscious the
constituent elements must already BE CONSCIOUS, i.e., it's to suppose that
syntax must be the same as semantics if it is to produce semantics and, since
we all agree it isn't, then it can't. Of course this again misses the point
that there is ANOTHER way syntax might produce semantics, a way that does NOT
depend on an identity claim!
> Gordon noted that I tell you that where I designate what each
> predicate variable (M, S, C etc) means; but, while that enables us to
> understand what the argument is about, it is unnecessary. a computerized
> proof checker would ignore those designations and only check the syntax.
>
And Neil's point that this can then prove nothing, except that certain
relations obtain, is correct.
> >Searle has told us it is a "conceptual truth", of course, and, as we
> >have seen, the non-identity reading does appear to be conceptually
> >true. But there is nothing conceptually true about the non-causal
> >reading.
>
> these concerns are irrelevant to the demonstration that the CRA is a
> valid argument; meaning, that the symbols are manipulated according to
> the rules of logic --- an entirely syntactic process.
>
Again, the CRA as Searle gives it is not valid because of his equivocation. I
agree that it can be recast to be valid (by removing the equivocation) but then
it does not demonstrate the truth of the conclusions it draws. To make it true,
you have to introduce an assumption at the CR and third premise level which is
then made explicit in the conclusion. But then that is circular unless there is
some independent evidence for believing that understanding must be present in
full somewhere in the system for the system to have understanding!
I am being called away this morning so I will stop here and try to pick this up
later, if that is warranted by further review below.
I'll just skip quickly ahead though before closing:
<snip>
> well, one of the purposes of tracking the assumption set on which each
> statement rests is to address out the suspicion that the proof rests on
> unacknowledged assumptions. there is no circularity. the conclusion
> rests on the three axioms alone.
Ah, this, it seems to me, is worth further exploring since I think circularity
would be introduced for the third premise and the conclusion to be seen to be
true but I haven't the time to fully address it now.
>
> >Note, as well, that the terms "constitutes" and "causes" have still not
> >been adequately explicated in this argument. After all, on Searle's own
> >view, what constitutes something can be described as its cause (see the
> >wetness of water example). Thus far, your version of the argument
> >leaves these relational descriptors badly underexplicated.
>
> the proof would become more precise if these terms were precisely
> defined; but, among other things, that would require rising above the
> imprecision of ordinary language; so, there's another trade-off. again,
> I chose to stick with the axioms as stated.
>
I think there is a fundamental difference between us. I think ordinary language
IS the best you can get, that whatever imprecisions are there are there because
of its richness and that getting rid of them via conversion to logical notation
is to lose a great deal. Logic makes manifest (that word again) certain
relations but it is necessarily limited in scope and much is lost in any such
translation. If it weren't we would habitually communicate in logic rather than
ordinary language. Everyone would prefer it. But that is not the case. Logic,
treated as you treat it, is a false religion. Logic, itself, is only a
distillation of certain aspects of language, a tool for certain purposes as it
were (say programming or parsing complex claims). When we use logic to add
complexity, it is obfuscatory, not clarifying.
> >Since you aim to turn this into a completely formal argument you have
> >to define all your terms and not rely on connotations or even ordinarly
> >language any longer.
>
> the terms in use should be defined more precisely whether we are
> discussing the CRA or the relative merits of Searle's case for the truth
> of the third axiom or your case against Searle's case.
>
Glad you agree.
> >By telling us what the difference is between "constitutes semantics"
> >and "causes semantics" you will be elaborating and clarifying why they
> >are related by the exclusive "or" disjunction (v) and if it is
> >appropriate that they can be considered to stand to one another in that
> >relation.
>
> the difference between causation and constitution is well worth
> discussing; but, I'm inclined to think that the SEP page on material
> constitution is more relevant to that discussion than something you may
> have heard in Ludwig's ordinary language sports bar.
Wittgenstein was one of the most perspicacious thinkers of the twentieth
century and a founder of modern logic (he invented the truth tables). His input
goes well beyond your demeaning characterization of it. Moreover, the SEP page
clearly showed how "constitutive" is not a simple term but, rather, one subject
to much dispute. Nor does it simply reduce to identity or causality as we have
seen. But philosophy is not about referencing authorities, it is about thinking
things through. Authority can often be helpful but it is rarely if ever
definitive.
> for one thing, you
> are only reporting on what Fred said on Tuesday. Barney said the exact
> opposite on Wednesday when he finally thought of a snappy comeback.
>
?
> why don't you start off a thread about the difference between causation
> and constitution; particularly, in reference to the type of reduction
> (causal, ontological or otherwise) associated with each of them.
>
I've referenced the issue already in some detail. Your failure to fully
explicate your terms in your logical argument is a serious deficit to your
effort.
> we know that Searle claims that there is a causal but not an ontological
> reduction of consciousness to brain; but, I thought that you were a
> little evasive in answering my question as to whether Dennett claimed
> that there is a causal and/or an ontological reduction and/or some other
> kind of reduction.
>
I gave you a straight and simple answer. You mean I didn't give you the answer
you where aiming to get?
SWM
> Joe
>
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