[Wittrs] The CRA in Symbolic Form (According to Joe)
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 07:05:40 -0400
it seems that I neglected to explain something about the conventions of
my notation. consider this line.
[7] Ua {1, 4}
the numbers in the [square brackets] are just step numbers. they allow
me to reference a proposition by the step number of the line at which it
appears.
the numbers in the {curly braces} represent the assumptions that have
been used to support the proposition stated to their left. so, Ua, the
proposition stated at [7] rests on the assumptions stated at [1] and
[4].
keeping track of the assumptions made shows which ones are working and
when; but, more importantly, they show that when the conclusion is
reached at [28], it only rests on [1], [2] and [3], which correspond to
the three axioms of the CRA.
* * *
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>I accept your usages though I question why you think it necessary to
>introduce different terms for "constituting semantic understanding" for
>instance and "constituting minds" since theoretically the same
>constitutive relation obtains.
this redundancy stems from accepting the second axiom as stated rather
than 'as argued'.
the second argument is stated as a simple predicate, a mind has semantic
understanding, which makes having semantic understanding a necessary
condition for being a mind. 'as argued', semantic understanding is also
a sufficient condition for being a mind. think of Searle's statements to
the effect that if an alien showed up and convinced us it was conscious,
we'd agree that it had a mind even though it had green slime instead of
a brain.
if I had explicitized this assumption, the second axiom would become a
biconditional (M -> S & S -> M); and, it would follow that what
constituted a mind also constituted semantic understanding and vice
versa.
it was a trade-off. I stayed with the literal meaning of the second
axiom; but, ended up with a longer proof.
>Here you have wrung out the prior ambiguity in Searle's terms. However,
>what you give us is stipulative, i.e., we need to know what its basis
>for being deemed true is other than an agreement to accept it for
>argument's sake.
yes, you *do* need this; but, you will *never* get that from a formal
proof --- which is entirely syntactic, just as Neil indicated.
any argument as to whether the third axiom is or is not true is a
separate argument. it requires understanding what the syntax is about.
Gordon noted that I tell you that where I designate what each
predicate variable (M, S, C etc) means; but, while that enables us to
understand what the argument is about, it is unnecessary. a computerized
proof checker would ignore those designations and only check the syntax.
>Searle has told us it is a "conceptual truth", of course, and, as we
>have seen, the non-identity reading does appear to be conceptually
>true. But there is nothing conceptually true about the non-causal
>reading.
these concerns are irrelevant to the demonstration that the CRA is a
valid argument; meaning, that the symbols are manipulated according to
the rules of logic --- an entirely syntactic process.
>Recall there are two issues:
>Is the argument valid?
>and
>Is the conclusion of the argument true?
we should all recall that there are these two separate issues.
>You say it's valid because Searle doesn't present it equivocally (I
>disagree for the reasons already given) but even if we wring out the
>equivocal usages of the third premise as you do, we still have to deal
>with the validity question if the argument assumes its own conclusion
>as I maintain it does.
well, one of the purposes of tracking the assumption set on which each
statement rests is to address out the suspicion that the proof rests on
unacknowledged assumptions. there is no circularity. the conclusion
rests on the three axioms alone.
>Note, as well, that the terms "constitutes" and "causes" have still not
>been adequately explicated in this argument. After all, on Searle's own
>view, what constitutes something can be described as its cause (see the
>wetness of water example). Thus far, your version of the argument
>leaves these relational descriptors badly underexplicated.
the proof would become more precise if these terms were precisely
defined; but, among other things, that would require rising above the
imprecision of ordinary language; so, there's another trade-off. again,
I chose to stick with the axioms as stated.
>Since you aim to turn this into a completely formal argument you have
>to define all your terms and not rely on connotations or even ordinarly
>language any longer.
the terms in use should be defined more precisely whether we are
discussing the CRA or the relative merits of Searle's case for the truth
of the third axiom or your case against Searle's case.
>By telling us what the difference is between "constitutes semantics"
>and "causes semantics" you will be elaborating and clarifying why they
>are related by the exclusive "or" disjunction (v) and if it is
>appropriate that they can be considered to stand to one another in that
>relation.
the difference between causation and constitution is well worth
discussing; but, I'm inclined to think that the SEP page on material
constitution is more relevant to that discussion than something you may
have heard in Ludwig's ordinary language sports bar. for one thing, you
are only reporting on what Fred said on Tuesday. Barney said the exact
opposite on Wednesday when he finally thought of a snappy comeback.
why don't you start off a thread about the difference between causation
and constitution; particularly, in reference to the type of reduction
(causal, ontological or otherwise) associated with each of them.
we know that Searle claims that there is a causal but not an ontological
reduction of consciousness to brain; but, I thought that you were a
little evasive in answering my question as to whether Dennett claimed
that there is a causal and/or an ontological reduction and/or some other
kind of reduction.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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