[Wittrs] The CRA in Symbolic Form (According to Joe)
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2010 07:06:50 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM wrote:
>>>Thus, as I have said here numerous times, the CRA depends finally on
>>>a dualistic presumption about consciousness, i.e., that it is
>>>ontologically basic, irreducible to anything more basic ontologically
>>>than itself. Dispense with that presumption and the CR does not
>>>demonstrate the inability of CR type processes to cause consciousness
>>>because what they cannot do in isolation is not necessarily denied
>>>them in the right kind of combination.
>>unless you can explain why formalist mathematicians do not need to
>>presuppose interactive substance dualism, you haven't shown that the
>>CRA depends on a presupposition of interactive substance dualism.
>Demonstrate that instead of asserting it.
I did. in my proof of the CRA, I did not need to assume interactive
substance dualism in order to derive the conclusion of the CRA from the
three axioms.
Neither did I assume a dualism of ontological basicness.
>the idea that consciousness is ontologically basic implies dualism
>which brings with it a whole host of other problems, not least of which
>the requirement that we add factors to the idea we have of the universe
>to explain it JUST TO ACCOUNT FOR THE PRESENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN
>IT.
you've reverted to your self-confusing attempt to suppress awareness of
the implicit noun modified by the adjective 'basis' in the phrase
'ontologically basic'.
it's important to ask 'ontologically basic *what*?' because only an
ontologically basic substance would require adding something new to the
universe to account for the presence of consciousness.
according to both Searle and Dennett, consciousness is a system property
of the brain. Searle thinks that there is a causal explanation of this
system property; meaning, that for Searle the brain accounts for the
presence of consciousness.
does Dennett disagree? not according to you. you say that, although
Dennett does not use that specific phrasing, he would acknowledge the
causal reduction of consciousness to brain. presumably he would also say
that such a causal explanation accounts for the presence of
consciousness.
so, where is the difference between them? what is this big difference
that makes one of them a closet dualist?
Searle says that there is no ontological reduction of consciousness to
brain; whereas, Dennett (according to you) would say there is.
if so; then, there is a problem.
Dennett would be saying that consciousness is nothing more than what
causes consciousness; specifically, that consciousness is nothing more
than the brain; or, more simply, that the mind *is* the brain.
Searle would be saying that consciousness is not identical to that which
causes consciousness; and, therefore, can not be ontologically reduced
to what causes it.
to sum up,
Searle: the mind is caused by the brain.
Dennett: the mind *is* the brain.
Stuart: and, therefore, Searle is a dualist.
Joe (to Stuart): non sequitur
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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