[Wittrs] The Alleged 4th Premise: Alternate Grounds for the Third Premise

  • From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2010 14:26:33 -0400

SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

the logical structure of Searle's CRA:

(A1) Programs are formal (syntactic).

(A2) Minds have mental contents (semantics).

(A3) Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for
semantics. (This is what the Chinese room experiment shows.)

(C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.

C1 follow from the first three axioms alone.

>>the controversy that Stuart is promoting does not concern the validity
>>of the argument. it concerns the grounds for thinking that A3 is true.

>>Stuart writes [2010-03-27 - 09:49 PM]:

"My point is that ... the only way the third premise (the one about not
being constitutive of nor sufficient for) can be true, WITHOUT ADDING
ANY EMPIRICAL INFORMATION (as in research to confirm Hawkins thinking or
Edelman's), is if we think consciousness has a certain characteristic,
namely that it must be a process property and therefore irreducible to
constituents that are qualitatively different than itself."

>>I challenge the last point, the claim that there is one and only one
>>way that Searle's third premise can be true.

>Okay. I hope you are challenging it solely with regard to the terms of
>Searle's argument and not by invoking external factors which Searle
>does not rely on.

you are confusing and conflating validity and truth again.

arguments about the validity of an argument need not send out for
external evidence; but, arguments for and against the truth of the
premises of an argument must do so.

>>I pointed out a few days ago that "there are grounds unrelated to the
>>CRA Presumption for believing that syntax does not constitute and is
>>not sufficient for semantics".

>I have repeatedly agreed that there MIGHT be empirical reasons to
>think of consciousness in a dualist way and/or for believing that
>computer processes were just the wrong sort to produce consciousness,
>either of which would have the effect of sustaining the CRA's
>conclusion.

true enough; but, the alternate grounds that I supplied came from
mathematics rather than science.

again, from the wikipedia article I quoted: "According to formalism, the
truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets,
or triangles or any other contensive subject matter - in fact, they
aren't 'about' anything at all. They are syntactic forms whose shapes
and locations have no meaning unless they are given an interpretation
(or semantics)."

now, Hilbert's attempt to reduce all of mathematics to syntactical
transformations failed; but, the point that's relevant in the current
context is that mathematicians acknowledge that attributing semantics to
syntax is an operation separate from manipulation of the syntax.

if mathematicians are right about that; then, there are grounds
unrelated to the CR for believing that the CRA's third premise is true

Joe


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Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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