--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote: > It will simply not do to argue that an experienceR exists by > virtue of the claim that it experienceS (or "has") experience -- > this does not establish the existence of the putative experienceR. I'm trying to make sense of this. This is what I get. We agree that we have experience. We agree that we experience ourselves as an experiencer. But since our experience of ourselves is part of our experience then there is way to tease apart the R from the E. > (as though the experienceR and its experience were somehow > distinct) Wouldn't you say, that distinctions can always be made or collapsed? Since all is just "molecules in motion" there is no distinction between malaria and Mozart. Or a distinction could be made, because it serves us to make one. Developmental psychology distinguishes between the early infant mind (in which subject and object are one) from terrible two yr. old, who having discovered himself, expects to routinely have his way. bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/