--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <jrstern@...> wrote: <snip> SWM: > > We KNOW that brains cause consciousness (Searle's use of "cause"). > > Does not make it a meaningful statement. > > Buicks don't "cause" trips to Macdonalds, in any sense I can see. > > Aristotle offers us formal, material, efficient, and final causations. Which > of these is Searle's usage? Perhaps something like material. However, I > suggest only efficient causation is valid in anything like modern terms, it > is certainly the only one I use for anything at all. > > Josh Hmmm, I don't see how buicks equate to brains or even automobiles (if we want to name the generic entity rather than the brand). Elsewhere someone on this list (you?) suggested that cars cause motion. Well they do and they don't. I guess if I rammed my car into a telephone pole and caused it to shake or snap in two, the car would be said to have caused the motion (Aristotle's efficient cause). But generally when I get in start my car (not a Buick) no one would say it was causing the motion as it moved forward. On the other hand, I, as the driver, could be labeled as the cause of that motion. The behavior of the engine in burning fuel and turning the crankshaft and gears could also be implicated as causes of the motion. It would depend what we were looking for. Well, in what sense does Searle mean that brains cause consciousness? We've been over this before of course. He means it in the same sense that molecules of H2O cause the feature we recognize as wetness in water. Or, better, the behavior of those molecules under certain ambient conditions. That is, the wetness just IS those molecules behaving as they do under the right conditions. As PJ once argued, that just means that the wetness just IS the molecules doing their thing, etc., etc. So is this claim of causation really just a masked form of an identity claim? Well, it all depends on the usage, no? There is an identity between certain physical constituents AND their actions on the one hand and certain sensations and occurrences on our level of observation on the other (we see the wet spot on the ground, we feel that it's wet to the touch, we watch it dissolve something, etc.) But this isn't just a claim of logical identity because the features on the macro level and the micro are different, i.e., the molecules aren't what we would call "wet". Wetness is not to be found in any of the constituents but only in the aggregate and on a certain level of observation. Do we need Aristotle's classifications here? Didn't Wittgenstein show us that words have many uses and there is no essential meaning? Ought we to conclude that Aristotle's four uses are the only ones possible? Or, perhaps, we can subsume this Searlean usage within one of the classical ones described by Aristotle? At the least the notion is clear enough because Searle (and I) have explicated it. Moreover, it is, indeed, consistent with how we actually speak. "Why is water wet?" "Well, because of the way its constituent parts interact." "You mean they cause the phenomena we call 'wetness' when we observe and have contact with it?" "Precisely!" Why is that kind of answer to such a question any less valid than saying the telephone pole moved because I slammed into it with my car? SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/