>> Cartesian dualism has a bad name only because of >> the philosophical problems that arise when grappling with >> the idea of something non-physical, so even if it makes >> you/Dennett feel warm and fuzzy inside to label >> Searle's view dualistic, it really doesn't matter: Searle's >> philosophy does not suffer from the problems of >> Cartesian dualism. > > > Well you can assert that, of course. One can always > assert one's beliefs. But this isn't a matter of belief alone > but of argument. Okay Stuart, here I offer you the most important part of the argument that I left out. I thought you already knew this but perhaps you don't: Cartesian dualism suffered from the fact that nobody least of all Descartes ever offered a plausible account of how non-physical mind could affect material matter, or how material matter could affect non-physical mind. Searle's non-dualistic philosophy does not have that weakness. On Searle's view, mental phenomena arise as high level *physical* features of the neurological substrate. If computers could do something similar, instead of running syntactic operations on symbols, then they could have mental phenomena too. I see nothing dualistic about Searle. It exists only in your confused rebuttal to the CRA in which you with help from Dennett imagine dualism where none exists. -gts ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/