--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: > My view is that consciousness can be accounted for by describing increasingly complex and sophisticated functionalities What's a functionality? Speaking, thinking, walking, ...what people do and say. Right? And developmentally psychology present a vast literature of studies that show the increasing complexity. And in that description, one takes for granted that the person under study is conscious. Since consciousness is an assumption, it's origin is not studied. Unless you are referring to the brain areas associated with consciousness. But then again, this is a cor-relational study in which one assumes that the person is conscious and measures brain activity. Of course, in doing so, the brain is considered a necessary condition for C, but this research never asks HOW the brain causes (produces) C. That the brain becomes increasingly complex does not address the HOW. Moreover, if we build an entity that we considered consciousness, it will not, in itself, tell us HOW the material we put in became conscious. It just does. > ...But if intentionality is describable No "buts" about it. We can describe intentionality. My question for you is this. If we describe intentionality in purposive terms, "I wrote this post because I enjoy conversing with you", then how do you reconcile this purposive account with a causal, non-purposive account of the brain? bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/