... yes, I remember segments of that discussion. I believe it was over the difficulty of the idea you might have had about what a "referent" was. You were saying, I think, that N could stand for any persons so named, and Walter was emphasizing that N was only standing for one of those persons. Wittgenstein's view doesn't dispute what "reference" means in this context. Wittgenstein isn't arguing that N stands for anyone so named (the way, e.g., "chair" does). His view appears to be premised on the idea that the name and its bearer are not identical. And that what a name does (to or about any discreet bearer) is a function of what sense the name is playing in the language game. One wants to say of words like proper names and of words like "is," the language game is TIGHT one. Imagine playing Charades versus the game of Operation. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_(game). Proper Names is more like Operation. What one is doing to or about the bearer takes place within more limited confines. Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860 Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/