I'm having some trouble differentiating Wittgenstein from Kripke and Russell on proper names. (I include Russell for the theory of descriptions). Wittgenstein writes about names in paragraphs 39, 40, 44 and 79 of PI. There are also some remarks in Zettel, but I don't have them in front of me at the moment. As I understand it, Wittgenstein's basic point is that people confuse the meaning of a name with its bearer. They think the two are one in the same. (He uses Moses and Excalibur as examples). Because proper names (PNs) mean something apart from their bearer, they take on SENSE and are subject to the "law" (forgive me) of meaning is use. But what are the senses of PNs? I have listed four. "Moses" can mean: (a) a title or rule (the man who saved the Israelites); (b) a description (the old person with a grey beard who works down the road); (c) ostensibility (that person right there); or (d) a branding (Moses is DNA profile such-and-such, or Social Security Number 233-33-5953). Therefore, PN's accurately exist as four BEHAVIORS. One of the things that is strange about PN's is that only some of the senses seem to rule the bearer. That is, one could say that Moses did not exist if the story of Israelites is false, even though a man named "Moses" to whom the story was attributed did, in fact, exist. It would be the same as saying "George Washington was the man who could never tell a lie," and learning that this is false -- he told many. And upon hearing of this, in your delusion, you might say, "The George Washington I know doesn't exist." It would be the same as saying "The God I know is dead" or "Love is a lie." All of these things say that the idealization is false (that the rule is violated). (You don't have to say this, of course -- it's just a sense of expression). But note that for other things -- like descriptions and social-security numbers -- we wouldn't care if they were wrong. We'd just fix them on the fly. In fact, that is what Wittgenstein says. He says that the meaning of PN's is variable DURING THEIR DEPLOYMENT. The idea is that if you found out that your understanding of certain qualities of the bearer was in error, you would simply amend those qualities and let the PN stand amended. That you don't need to have much there or even right. And that this is the way PN's play in the language game. Now what does this do to Kripke and Russell? If I understand Kripke, he rejects (a), (b), and (c), and thinks that all PN's reduce to (d), only by science -- is that a correct read? I mean, I understand Kripke best when we are talking about certain kinds of scientific jargon. I guess I'm having trouble seeing how PN's are the same basic thing as those kinds of jargon. It seems to me the only way you can say that PN's are rigid designators is to say that: (a) the bearer and the name are always the same (which isn't true); and (b) that PN's can only exist in the form of a reduction (sense (d) above, only not for social-security numbers). Here's what I am saying. For Kripke, "Moses" can only be a DNA profile (in which it is never inseparable from its bearer), just as the vin number on my auto (or perhaps the ID number on the title) is its ultimate identifier. And as such, PN's work like some kinds of scientific jargon (Water-H20). Do I have that right (Kripke v. Wittgenstein)? Now, what does Wittgenstein's view of PN's do to Russell? Here, the idea of the theory of descriptions is in trouble, right? Because, after Wittgenstein, you cannot say of "Moses" that it refers to (a) an X; (b) its definition -- because, (1) meaning is use; (2) the bearer and PN are different; and (c) the definition is in flux by virtue of the way the PN language game exists. Do I have that right? (Sigh). Yours always appreciative Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860 Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/