[Wittrs] Re: No Effing Way--Again
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2010 18:27:07 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 4/30/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> >> Read the third axiom at face value. You'll notice
> >> nothing there about consciousness or its causes!
> >>
> >
> > The third premise plays a role in the argument, the CRA.
>
> The question here concerns the claim of the third axiom, not the claim of the
> CRA as a whole.
The significance of the third premise has to do with its role in the argument.
Nobody argues that syntax is the same as semantics, that an instance of syntax
constitutes an instance of semantics or that, if you have an instance of
syntax, it is sufficient to say you have an instance of semantics.
Searle says this is conceptually true and I don't think there's any reason to
dispute that.
> I see no "non-causality claim" in the 3rd.
That's because it's not really there unless one reads that into it which, of
course, you have to do if you want to move from the third premise to the
conclusion of the CRA.
If you just want to stop with saying syntax isn't the same as semantics and it
isn't what we mean when we speak of semantics, more power to you. No one here
is disagreeing! But it has NO implication for the non-causality conclusion of
the argument of which this statement is the third premise!
>I see only a simple claim about syntax and semantics: a claim that the former
>neither constitutes nor suffices for the latter. I see nothing more than that,
>and the truth of this axiom seems to me pretty darned obvious.
>
Sure it is, if you stop there. But you can't stop there if you take the
statement that is the third premise as a premise in a larger argument, as
Searle presents it! Then you have a non-identity claim that is called upon to
sustain a non-causality conclusion. BUT NON-IDENTITY DOESN'T IMPLY
NON-CAUSALITY.
So you have to say instead that, for semantics to be present in the CR, it must
be identical with one or more of the CR's constituents and that the reason it's
not present there is that it isn't so identical.
But THIS depends on a belief that semantics (understanding) cannot be made up
of something that isn't the same as what it is, i.e., that isn't understanding.
That is, this implies a belief that semantics or understanding is some kind of
ontological basic, that it's irreducible to anything else. Yet this is to
dismiss another perfectly good alternative: that understanding (semantics) be
understood as a system level property. If that is what it is, then the fact
that it isn't identical with (a property of) any of the CR's constituent
processes is not evidence that such processes could not be combined to form a
system which did have THAT particular feature.
> Every time I bring this up, you reply by looking outside the 3rd axiom for
> evidence to support your contention that the 3rd really means or could mean
> something other than what it plainly states.
>
That's because this isn't about the claim that syntax and semantics aren't the
same. NO ONE DISPUTES IT. This is about what it takes to cause (as in make
happen, produce, engender) understanding. The third premise is a step in an
argument that addresses that. And as such a step, reading it as a claim of
non-identity doesn't work UNLESS you believe that understanding is irreducible,
an ontological basic, must be one or more of the features of the CR for it to
be found in the CR.
That is, you must believe that for anything to make X it must already be X. But
that makes no sense and certainly doesn't match anything we currently know
about the world!
> Apparently you don't understand the role that axioms and premises play in
> formal arguments, or your thinking is hopelessly muddled, or both!
>
> -gts
>
Or that that description applies to you. But just railing at one another about
this sure ain't gonna settle it. Neither, of course, will putting this to a
vote! Will anything settle it? I guess not. Understanding any issue or concept
is finally an individual thing. I guess that's why Wittgenstein thought it a
waste of time to engage in logical disputes. You either see the truth of
something (if it's there to see) or you don't. The rest is just so much
palavering.
SWM
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