-- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kirby urner <wittrsamr@...> wrote: >> It's a token, a moving part, a component, a cog. There >> need be no specific experience or phenomenon at the >> other end of a pointing stick. > There *need* be none, but there *might* be one. > > Same for "cat" or "John". Consider the fact that we may speak of the word "John" and yet there's no singular instance of this word, as new uses of "John" occur literally millions of times a second all over the world. Words themselves are mostly anonymous, not itemized, as language is a "socialist" enterprise, free and open source, until you get to the trademarked words and phrases, or "priests only" sacred sayings, which to a commoner are perhaps off limits. Likewise with "cat". Say "cat" with wild abandon, with no royalties due. In this sense, we could say words themselves escape being named, tagged, referred to individually except in relatively rare circumstances. This begins to change in a computer, where every string of bytes has a starting memory address, more like in a printing shop, where each physical instance of a word has heft, takes up room. I mention this rather obvious fact to emphasize that relatively few things in our world receive names such that we might track them over time, even our very words, which are more like grains of sand, pebbles, all without names of ID tags. Most nouns such as "belt" or "box" give us a momentary way of fixing attention and sharing information about specifics, then releasing said items from attention, with no permanent tagging or naming. You won't know if that seagull is the same one from last week, though in principle we apply the same grammar of persistent identity (lots of philosophical literature on this concept of "identity"). A friend and I both look at this grain of sand or this microbe under a microscope, then lose it back into the mix. We don't incur the overhead of needing to establish "same" versus "different" in so many games with "referents" -- just wanted to remind us of this fact. Of course scientists, in their need to monitor and track over time, have extended the need for labeling, applying serial numbers, other tags -- learning from merchants and their evolving bookkeeping games. Notions of "cardinality" (keeping things distinct, perhaps with no ordering or only a partial ordering) connect to notions of "ranking" (sorting, indexing, devising a system for storage and retrieval -- addressing). [ what's engaging, for me about writing this, is I'm at the same time focusing on a specific capacitor inside a DVD player and reading on the web about replacing it -- engineers and owners of electronics take advantage of our industrial age ability to get very very specific about things (it's not the fact that the capacitor has a named position on the circuit board that amazes so much as the fact there's a whole literature on this particular problem with this particular model of DVD player -- the so-called "knowledge explosion" has its advantages ] We might call language an "attention management system" in that it allows humans to control what we call "focus". At least that's one thing it's good for: concentrating the attention of one or more people on the same task, activity or item, a prerequisite for getting work done in many cases. Nouns help, proper names not always required, i.e. only sometimes to we care about "identity over a relatively long period of time". > The point is that language is *independent* from > ontological commitments - or fulfillments, not > that such referals are never valid, nor that there > really aren't cats or minds out there somewhere. Comparing "cats" with "minds" in the sense that both are "out there somewhere" is just playing into this sense that minds are localized spatial objects of a ghostly nature (ghostly because we have no agreement on how to point to them, as distinct from brains or cats or cats' brains). This is to fall victim to a random image, to buy into a mental picture that goes nowhere, a kind of dead end. Both "cat" and "mind" have instrumental applications in social situations. "That's not what I have in mind" means something like "that's not the course of action I was intending" or "this was not my dream for the future" or "I was envisioning something else." This isn't the same instrumental use for "cat", a different kind of tool, although one might have a sacred being associated with cats (e.g. Bastet) that one prayed to for guidance (i.e. fixing a future course of action has been a job for oracles, a function some serve even today, thought that's not what's on the business card usually (the term "oracle" has been deprecated, except we still have "the oracle of Omaha")). >> The pre-Wittgensteinian believes that words >> are primarily nouns or names that tag objects. > I would note that many post-Wittgensteinians believe so too. > (cough) Kripke (cough) > Unless such are taken as atavistic throwbacks. I've taken issue with Kripke at some length on another elists, have also heard him in person at Princeton, though this was on a visit, after I'd already moved on. He writes about Nixon doesn't he? As an example of a proper name? Google confirms. I've been writing about Nixon lately in my blogs, or about Nixon-Kissinger (almost like a hybrid individual). Kripke will go down in history associated with Nixon. The meaning of the word "Kirpke" has been affected by the meaning of the word "Nixon" (their word-meaning trajectories have altered, is how I might put it, a fancy way of talking about "karma" -- or "precession" in the Buckminster Fullerian sense). > I'm also trying to remember my college linguistics, > I suspect there are other linguistic traditions pre- > Wittgenstein that do not take words as quite that > atomic, certainly the universally understood linguistic > fact that sounds or marks are arbitrary and only > acquire even simple associational meanings in > context or by use, is along these lines. And > skepticism about the quality of associational > meanings is a long tradition. So, carefully drawn, > it may be a bit more difficult to find what exactly > in Wittgenstein is a new and unique take on > language, than just to say pre- and post-. Yes, true. My off-the-cuff answer was that Wittgenstein was role modeling a practice, a method, showing us ways to investigate, to disentangle. He was less into writing discursive 10,000 foot overview stuff, melodious grand summaries, which is pretty much the meat and potatoes of most philosophy. He needed a more aphoristic style and an implied sense that it'd all fold up via hyperlinks (a term not yet coined) and make a light go on. More like setting a trap or, more positively, freeing us from a trap. The Philosophical Investigations are supposed to "spring to life" as it were, as when you look at a 2D pattern of lines and suddenly see a 3D figure. Duckrabbit analogy, or the tetrakis (obscure!). > And then, Quine (post-W) has his famous holistic > statement: our statements about the external world > face the tribunal of sense experience not individually, > but only as a corporate body That's somewhat clever, has that Roman influence so evident in Anglo culture (where the idea of "a tribune" comes from). > The problem is that holism is as problematic as > word-atomism. We need, we use, all sorts of > strategies in our everyday language. "Meaning as > use" covers many, it doesn't outlaw much of anything. It's a nudge away from nominalism and towards operationalism. What I take from the "meaning as use" dictum is "meaning" is not some phenomenon staring you in the face (as it were) at the time of a singular usage. You need to watch an hour long documentary, let us say, to really have a sense of the meaning. If you want to study "pain" (it's meaning), it's not a matter of pinching your arm or biting your tongue and saying to yourself THIS is what pain means. That'll reinforce your nominalist tendencies, but you won't get that Wittgensteinian sense of language games, of grammar. >> Even this slight variation for the norm >> helps break the hold of the idea of >> "referents". I am Robert one day, George >> the next, and it's easy to see these names >> as tools, tokens. > The entire computational art of "neural networks" > shows how you can duplicate referential systems > with virtually no references at all. > Quine's holism is also purportedly reference-free > - more like reference-problematic I suppose, but > it's over in that direction. Feel free to elaborate. >> Computer languages were far less evolved >> when Wittgenstein was writing, however they >> today provide a clear exhibit of meaning as >> use, as the language games have everything >> to do with driving machinery, making things >> happen, more like those "orders in battle" he >> was talking about (indeed, we speak of "imperative >> languages" sometimes, of expressions as >> "commands"). > But most languages tend to be very referential > in their styles. I'll have more to say about this sometime. > However, what do they refer to - real entities in > the world, or conventional entities we stipulate > - objects we make up, virtual gears for our > virtual watch? >> [ Speaking of Python, we also have a strong nominalist >> model in that everything is an object and every object >> has its names (note use of the plural). Yes, that's right, >> the very same object may have lots and lots of names, >> all pointing to the very same thing. > But this is an inverse to what the main meaning of > nominalism is, or certainly the main point of nominalism > for me, which is that systems can manipulate by the > names, without ever knowing what the real objects are. > When I go to the Claim Jumper restaurant, they hand > me a tag that says, "Clem". When they have a table > for me, they call for "Clem", and I go and sit down. > I'm not Clem, except for the moment, in this context, > but the "name" works. Hey, that's like my cocktail party example, didn't know a certain restaurant chain (?) had already institutionalized this language game. Aside: what if we said "mind game" instead of "language game"? How would that make a difference? > The restaurant never makes any ontological commitments > to anything about me, except that I can fill the role of a > Clem. I'm getting the feeling that I could maybe learn your language. If you could drain away any sense of ontological commitment from language, I think you'd be at a certain place in the TLP -- I need to dig up the passage. That's the value-free world of pure facts, separate from what waxes and wanes in the aesthetic dimension. > (hence "functionalism", but this is a distraction, not > where I'm going at all) > How a Kripkean could ever make sense of this I don't > know, they would see the associational "baptism" and > understand that, but how it would then be true that > I am "necessarily Clem in all possible worlds" or > "rigidly designated" by a name that will in an hour > refer to someone else entirely - would seem to not > work at all. Oh, they'd make up an entire new > metaphysics - to explain the waiting system > at the restaurant. Good luck with that. Interesting. I like getting philosophical about restaurants practices, very Wittgensteinian. > A Wittgensteinian can just say, "meaning is use", > and have more time to drink beer. Raising a glass. "To Wittgenstein!" >> For this reason alone I would urge anyone >> wishing to understand the later Wittgenstein >> to pay some attention to computer languages. > I absolutely agree, watching the mechanics of > how computing systems compile and execute > languages is another world that any modern > philosopher of language or mind can only > benefit from, whether it ever turns out that > human brains work this way or not. So how might we challenge the universities to upgrade their philosophy curricula? I suppose it's a political issue. I have the same issue with high school math curricula. Why is it OK to stay stuck in the age of calculators? If you went with an object oriented language ala the Litvins text, used at Phillips Andover... but I digress. Sounds like we agree on this point however. Thanks for chatting. Kirby ========================================== Manage Your AMR subscription: //www.freelists.org/list/wittrsamr For all your Wittrs needs: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/