[Wittrs] Re: Is the Third Axiom True?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2010 19:19:37 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> Bogus Claim 1: Cartesian Dualism Does Not Require Two Kinds of 'Stuff'
>
We've already been over this. I really don't plan to repeat myself for yet
another time. Go back and read my previous remarks on this.
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>the claim that Searle's TATA (the Third Axiom is True Argument) has a
> >>dualistic presumption is the crucial move in this version of the FUD;
> >>and, interestingly enough, contains a genuine equivocation concerning
> >>the meaning of 'dualism'.
>
> >>according to Searle, it is not enough to explain the third-person
> >>measurable aspects of understanding; one must also explain the
> >>first-person experiential aspects of understanding as well. this is
> >>phenomenological dualism. this is the dualism that the TATA assumes:
> >>that there is subjective experience that must be accounted for.
>
> >>it is not necessary to presuppose Cartesian style interactive
> >>substance dualism in order to explain phenomenological dualism; so,
> >>the TATA does not presuppose such an explanation.
>
> >Even Searle would think you miss the point when you tell us that
> >"phenomenological dualism" (your term, apparently, for "property
> >dualism") is at the heart of Searle's claim.
>
> you really are a little slow on the uptake, Stuart; so, pay attention as
> I reveal this profound truth about my vocabulary: my term for property
> dualism is "property dualism".
>
You mean you haven't made up another "1,2,3" system this time?
> >Even he will tell you he is not a dualist because to be a dualist is
> >to believe in at least two underlying ontological basics (which he
> >calls, with traditional philosophy, "substance dualism") and he claims
> >not to (though, as I've suggested, I think he implicitly does).
>
> Searle doesn't use your vocabulary of ontological basicalities;
But he and I share the same view that it all comes down to whether one means
that mind is reducible to something more basic or not.
> but, it
> is easy enough to translate his relevant explicitly made statements into
> your vocabulary. this would show that Searle has two ontological
> basicalities; and, hence, that he is a dualist (of some sort).
>
Congratulations then.
> the key move in the Mirsky FUD occurs now.
>
> after counting an ontologically basic substance and an ontologically
> basic phenomenon as two ontological basicalities, you redefine
> 'ontological basic' in mid argument (a genuine equivocation, BTW) so
> that anyone with two ontological basicalities is presumed to have two
> ontologically basic substances.
Nope, you simply insist on claiming that to speak of an ontologically basic
substance is not the same as to speak of an ontological basic (which could be
something called a "substance" or something called something else).
> voila! substance dualism without any
> evidence of a second kind of 'stuff'.
>
It's not about stuff or substances but about ontological basicness.
> you've often claimed that Dennett agrees with you on this point; but, it
> is clear that Dennett understands that Cartesian style dualism requires
> having two kinds of 'stuff'. Dennett, in fact, speaks of 'physical
> stuff' and 'mind stuff' when discussing Cartesian dualism.
>
So what? The idea of "ontological basics" covers stuffs, substances, or
anything else that one might want to imagine is nonreducible to anything more
basic, yet different, than itself.
> so, the question is whether you agree with Dennett on this point: that
> Cartesian dualism requires two kinds of 'stuff'; or, that no philosophy
> of consciousness can be considered substance dualism unless it
> postulates two kinds of 'stuff'.
>
The idea of stuff or substance are an old hat way of expressing what I have
been talking about in a more generic way, a way that's neutral with regard to
ascriptions of substance, etc.
And you're just wasting my time by insisting on a particular vocabulary.
SWM
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