[Wittrs] Is Homeostasis the Answer? (Re: Variations in the Idea of Consciousness)
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 01:36:29 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> We disagreed on what we mean by "mechanism", so presumably we disagree
> on what we mean by "machine." It's not that "something more" is
> happening. Rather, it is that something different is happening.
>
Perhaps. My reference in this case was to a device constructed by beings like
us. While I agree with Searle that the brain can be called a machine and I do
think that "mechanism" is not limited in its reference to manmade mechanical
devices, these considerations aren't relevant to the particular use which, I
believe, you were responding to here. Thus, I can't imagine that we are
actually in disagreement about THAT use (that a "machine" is a manmade
mechanical device designed and built to perform certain operations).
> I see a mechanism as a system that follows rules by application of
> brute causal force. If I throw a brick into the mechanism, either the
> brick will be smashed to small parts, or the mechanism will jam up and
> fail.
>
> If I throw a brick into a stream, the stream keeps flowing. It just
> goes around the brick. It adapts to changing circumstances in a "go
> with the flow" kind of way. I see that kind of adaptive behavior as
> very different from mechanistic behavior.
>
On the use of "mechanism" I have invoked, the movement of the stream involves
some mechanism, too, in this case the way(s) in which the molecular
constituents of the stream operate at a deeper level. But one could also speak
of a stream's mechanism in more macro terms, e.g., by referring to its
behavioral tendencies.
At the deepest level there is no reason to think there aren't physical
operations (which may not even look like the operations we can observe at our
level) that underlie and determine the behavior of things like streams and
cells (which you bring in below).
But this seems to reveal a fundamental difference in our viewpoint as I am
willing to consider the mechanistic underpinning of these observed
entities/phenomena while I am sensing here that you are always going to want to
come back to a picture that presumes such a mechanistic description irrelevant.
I would say you are really importing the view we have of the phenomena in
question on the macro level to a more micro level (the realm of atomic parts
and behaviors). That, I would suggest, is a mistake because it presumes
irreducibility in order to argue against the possibility of a mechanistic
reduction. It looks to me to be an argument by stipulation, by fiat.
> A computer is a sophisticated complex mechanism that can give a
> mechanistic solution to very complex tasks. A biological organism is a
> complex adaptive system that can do complex tasks adaptively and
> without being based on causal rule following.
>
As Edelman points out (though he argues that brains have way more complexity
than computers can ever have -- a spurious argument for the case he aims to
make, in my view), at a deep level, brains are driven by the genomic blueprints
found in our DNA (a complex coding that he believes is far more complex at its
core than the binary coding of computational technology). If brains are like
that (and there is plenty of reason in biology to think they are), then the
fact that they are, as you put it, "adaptive" can be explained as a function of
their complexity rather than as a basic function that differs qualitatively
from the causally driven behaviors of traditional computers. And this, in the
end, IS the point of Dennett's argument. As you may recall from that section of
Consciousness Explained that I transcribed onto this list in response to a
challenge from Joe, Dennett writes "complexity matters." This is fundamental to
his thesis and the way he explains how what you are calling "adaptiveness"
arises.
> Sure, one can have a computer system that is pseudo-adaptive. It is
> programmed to do many complex tasks and appears to be adaptive for the
> circumstances for which it is programmed. But a true adaptive system
> is not following any strict causal rule system, and can more readily
> adapt to a wide variety of circumstances for which there was no
> preprogramming.
>
Given the tremendous complexity of the physical world and of our physical
selves (including our brains), what reason have we to think that at a deeper
level we aren't causally determined, too? By "causally determined" note that I
don't mean to suggest a condition where what we mean by "freedom" in our
ordinary usages is precluded. Indeed, sufficient complexity would likely make
us free enough, to all intents and purposes, since outcomes would be beyond
prediction even if they are determined by physical forces because, of course,
we could not know in advance how things will turn out even if physical factors
(in the broad sense of physical) causally underlie appearance.
I think by focusing on "adaptiveness" (the mechanism you want to implicate as
how homeostasis produces consciousness then?), you are projecting behavioral
characteristics from the observational level of ordinary human operations (the
macro level) to the micro level of the atomic and sub-atomic world. Perhaps, at
that micro level, the usual rules we see at our level do break down though (as
quantum theory proposes). Still it would be what happens at that level,
however we want to characterize it, that would drive and determine what happens
at our observational/operational level. Supposing that the "adaptive" behaviors
we see in cells or waterways are the same sort of thing ("adaptive") at the
micro level strikes me as the mistake here, even though it is possible that
something like "quantum mechanics" is not "mechanics" in the usual sense of the
latter term. Still it would be a kind of "mechanics" and discovering the
dynamics of operation would be important to understanding how behaviors are
manifested by phenomena at increasingly "higher" levels.
> The logic chip is, in some sense, an elemental mechanical system.
> Similarly, the homeostatic process is an elemental adaptive system.
>
If the homeostatic system's adaptive behavior is a function of the operating
mechanics of its constituents, which is hardly an unreasonable supposition
given what we know of chemistry and physics, then there is no reason to presume
that "adaptiveness" is a stand-alone or otherwise basic competitor of "caused
behaviors". Indeed, it could be as easily described, maybe more reasonably
described, as an outcome of particular causal interactions.
>
> > Thus far it seems to me that those who, like Searle, insist on the
> > first person picture over everything else simply have no real answer
> > and make no attempt at a real answer.
>
> I agree that Searle has no real answer, and no great interest in
> finding one. He thinks that's the job of scientists. But it seems to
> me that Dennett has no real answer either, though he thinks that he has
> one.
>
Yes, here we differ though I want to stress that I am not claiming that Dennett
is arguing for the truth of his thesis. It seems to me that all he is doing is
saying THIS is a better way to account for the features we associate with
consciousness and, if so, it remains to be refined, implemented and tested in
an appropriate scientific regimen (such as the right AI project), subject to
feedback from such an inquiry and any needed adjustment.
Yes, Dennett thinks his answer is right but then who, having developed an
answer in which he or she has confidence, doesn't think he or she is right? It
would be odd not to! Dennett, of course, does see his role as complementary to
that of the scientists and, indeed, as spilling into the scientific domain on a
theoretical level. Searle is more clearly the philosopher in these matters,
i.e., he stands apart and invokes argument and logic to demonstrate the truth
of his positions.
>
> > Hawkins view is that each neuron performs a fairly simple, repetitive
> > algorithm but that when organized together in complex arrays, they
> > work in unison to produce the complex pictures of the world that
> > we actually get from the inputs we receive all the time.
>
> I would suggest that a neuron is adaptive, rather than algorithmic.
> That is, it is not actually following any rules.
>
In keeping with what I've already said, it seems to me that the distinction you
are making is wrongheaded. Whatever is adaptive is so because of its underlying
mechanisms which are describable as algorithms (sets of procedural steps). Not
all algorithms are matters of formal calculation (though it may well be the
case that all are reducible in some fashion to such a way of expressing them).
Thus, for a neuron to be "adaptive" is for it to have a certain set of
mechanisms that are expressed in what we would call adaptive behaviors.
>
> > I would ask the same question: what are boundaries?
>
> To a first approximation, a sharp transition in the signal received
> when scanning crosses that boundary.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
> =========================================
Isn't sharpness relative along with most everything else? Where we draw the
line may depend on lots of factors including sensitivities, contexts, etc.
Anyway, and in keeping with my question, is the breakdown of the underlying
relations, relative to how we get consciousness, that you want to give the
following then:
Homeostasis produces Pragmatic Selection produces Perception produces
Adaptiveness produces Consciousness?
SWM
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