When I ascribe personhood I'm not purposing there is concrete entity which is the person, yet I'm saying that the person is embodied in his body. In that sense, the human body is expressive in the way that sticks and stones are not.
I ascribe personhood to a particular class of objects as a result of the linguistic conditioning to which I have been subjected over my lifetime. I ascribe personhood primarily to human beings but I often widen my use of the word to apply to some non-human animals like dogs and horses because they show such distinctive "personalities". I don't understand the idea of a person as something that is "embodied in his body" (as though the person were distinct from the body and its behavior). BruceD wrote:
Again, I'm not postulating, I'm not adding anything to ordinary experience which comes with this polarity, namely, a world of objects and me the one who experiences the objects. These two come as one piece. You seem to want to split off one piece,viz., the experiencer and have the object of experience hanging out on its own.
The polarity you mention consists of a world of objects and a particularly significant object within that world, specifically the object that is modeling that world and modeling its own place within that world. The model includes the ideas of sensory input and of the processing of the information obtained through those senses, and the idea of motor output based on that processing, as they pertain to a certain class of objects within that world (the afforementioned "particularly significant object" being a member of that class). The idea of "conscious experience" (in the sense in which Joe and I were discussing it) has no application in that world given that it is non-empirical and that the sensorimotor control loop leaves no role for it. ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/