[Wittrs] Re: I Experience in Ordinary Language

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2010 09:28:16 -0800 (PST)

--- On Sat, 3/6/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Actually, as I recall, Searle is on record as saying that
> there would be no basis for suggesting that an alien with
> what appeared to be green slime in its head (or whatever
> passes for that) wasn't conscious if it acted in a conscious
> way. While he presumes there is some physical arrangement
> that makes consciousness possible, he doesn't take the stand
> that there can only be one type of arrangement, namely
> brains or what we take to be brain-like, that can do it. I
> don't recall the source of this example but it is probably
> to be found in one of the following:

True, he does not take the stand that there cannot be some other arrangement, 
and he allows for such speculation. But In _Rediscovery of Mind_ (third 
chapter, if memory serves) he argues that we ought not to ascribe consciousness 
solely on behaviorist grounds. He argues as I have: that we should look both at 
neurological similarity and behavior. With these criteria we can ascribe 
consciousness not only to our fellow humans but also to some other animals. 



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