Your claim expands to "there is an 'I' that experiences the data of experience",
Joseph Polanik replied:
not when I do the expanding, it doesn't. my claim, as *I* expand it, becomes: I am the referent of 'I' whenever I assert 'I experience'.
So you're claiming that there is *no* 'I' that experiences the data of experience, and you are that 'I'?
I don't know about you; but I appear within my stream of experiences; and, as evidence, there is self-referencing.
I'm not calling into question the act of self-referencing when the physical organism is referring to the physical organism that is doing the referring. Confusion arises when the idea of self is taken to be something more than just the physical organism, namely the putative "experiencer" of the data of experience, and the putative agent of free will. This "experiencer" and this "agent" appear nowhere in the data of experience, and neither is there anything in the data of experience that gives grounds for postulating the existence of such a conceptual entity for the purpose of explanation.
I am the referent of 'I' whenever I assert 'I am self-referencing'; consequently, I am in fact self-referencing whenever I assert 'I am self-referencing'. whatever would make you think otherwise? can you assert 'I am not self-referencing' without thereby performing a self-reference?
If I were to I assert that "I am not self referencing", it would be incorrect in this way: The physical organism is denying that the physical organism is making that denial. This has nothing to do with any putative "experiencer" of the data of experience. "I experience (e.g. an afterimage)" is just a turn of phrase in common speech, and it is just such turns ofphrase that mislead us into misconceiving this "experiencer".
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