[Wittrs] Re: Dualism Cooties: The Argument About What the Argument is About

  • From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 00:28:25 -0000

I propose to turn the tables on Stuart's claim that Searle is a closet dualist 
by showing that Dennett must be a closet dualist also.

After making an airtight case, and conceding the awesome proof by Stuart that 
Searle must be a closet dualist, I will attempt to use the principle of 
transitivity to show where all philosophy must forever be found:  In the closet.

Later, we will equip the closet with a lightbulb which, according to Davidson 
according to Fodor, it will be noted that it takes two to even think of 
changing once it burns out.

We will find the light again and commence to arguing ourselves into the dark 
ages once more to discover philosophy where it always has been and will remain: 
 In the closet.

So, to commence:

1.  Computation doesn't name an intrinsically physical process.

2.  Dennett holds a computational theory of mind.

Ergo 3. Dennett's theory of mind is either an absolute idealism, a critical 
idealism, or some form of dualism.


In fairness, let's note another knock-down argument inspired by Stuartian 
premises:

1.  Computers are physical.

2.  Searle argues that computers can't cause consciousness.

Ergo, 3.  For Searle, consciousness can only be caused by consciousness or some 
other nonphysical thing.


As I believe both these arguments, at one time or another, are seen to be 
knock-down arguments, it will be noted that at the intersection of said times, 
there is a time, however fleeting, where both sides argue against the other 
while holding the same position.

I believe that was pretty fun, if not knock-down!

Cheers,
Budd

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