SWM wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >>in _Consciousness Explained_ Dennet does not accuse Searle of having >>dualism cooties. Dennett just claims that Searle was wrong to deny >>that the Chinese Room lacked understanding. you might repost the >>material you say I overlooked or help me find it by providing a link, >>a message # or the posting date >I posted it nearby in another post responding to Budd. thank you. I've found your post from 2010-01-31 in which you quote some material including the next paragraph and then provide a parenthetical comment: Dennett: "Here is how the misdirection occurs. We see clearly enough that if there were understanding in such a giant system, it would not be Searle's understanding (since he is just a cog in the machiery, oblivious to the context of what he is doing). We also see clearly that there is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily -- whatever it is, it's just a mindless routine for transforming symbol strings into other symbol strings according to some mechanical or syntactical recipe. Then comes the suppressed premise: Surely more of the same, no matter how much more, would never add up to genuine understanding. But why should anyone think this is true? Cartesian dualists would think so, because they think that even human brains are unable to accomplish understanding all by themselves . . ." Stuart: [Recall my point that Searle's CRA hinges on an implicit case of substance dualism.] I stand by my previous conclusion about Dennett's case against Searle; but, given your insistence that Dennett is implicitly accusing Searle of substance dualism, I will admit that one could interpret Dennett's seductive rhetoric as an invitation to perpetrate a logical fallacy. and you fell for it, Stuart. Dennett's premise is that if you are a Cartesian Dualist (C) then you will deny that there is any understanding (-U) in the chinese room C -> -U interestingly enough, this is probably true; but, of course, that's irrelevant to the logical validity of the argument. there are two things you can do with a conditional statement like that 1: Deny the Consequent [valid] [1]: C -> -U [2]: U [3]: -C this is a valid move and is known as modus tollens. Dennett denies that there is a lack of understanding (--U) in the chinese room. this is equivalent to saying that there is understanding (U). from this we may validly conclude that Dennett is not a Cartesian dualist (-C) 2: Affirm the Consequent [invalid] [1]: C -> -U [2]: -U [3]: C clearly, Searle denies that there is understanding in the chinese room. however, to conclude from this that Searle is a Cartesian or substance dualist is fallacious (without first proving that it is logically impossible for anyone not a Cartesian dualist to deny that there is understanding in the chinese room). http://www.onegoodmove.org/fallacy/affirm.htm Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/