--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote: <snip> > > take your own advice. be supportive of the following fact: the > Dennett's theory of consciousness can't possibly be correct unless von > Neumann is wrong about quantum mechanics. > > Joe You mean your interpretation of von Neumann? Bear in mind that I have already agreed that if dualism is true then Dennett's thesis, which denies dualism is necessary for understanding consciousness is not true. But then the issue is still that there is no reason to believe dualism is true absent 1) affirmative evidence that it is or 2) a failure of any other theory to account for consciousness. Since I believe Dennett's theory adequately accounts for it AND I have seen NO affirmative evidence in favor of dualism, I have no reason to think dualism is true. So why does it make any difference to argue that dualism as held by von Neumann (assuming you have him right) is true? I previously asked if you could explicate the thesis you present about von Neumann's views and you gave us a I,II,III system of categories of things that are and related that to a restated 1,2,3 system of your own and, on that basis, said dualism was implied (logically that is). I responded by suggesting that there was nothing in this classification that couldn't also accord with a non-dualist picture of consciousness UNLESS you already started by assuming dualism. And that can't establish anything since it is a circular claim (assuming its conclusion). So, again, what's the point of your asking me to acknowledge that Dennett's thesis is inconsistent with a putative von Neumannian claim of dualism. Well of course it is since Dennett is arguing that we don't need dualism to account for mind! SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/