[Wittrs] Re: Dancing Dualisms: Searlean Moves and Cartesian Moves

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 07:47:11 -0700 (PDT)

--- On Fri, 3/26/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> But then Searle is a "property dualist" since he just expresses the same
> notion differently, i.e., in his claim that consciousness
> has a first person ontology that is irreducible to the third
> person ontology of so-called physical things.

But Searle doesn't make that claim. He acknowledges that we can reduce mental 
phenomena to physics both causally and ontologically if we so choose. He also 
observes that it would make no sense to do the ontological reduction, as we 
would lose the concept that interests us. 

By contrast, property and substance dualists outright deny the possibility of 
an ontological reduction on the grounds that mental phenomena have a 
non-physical kind of reality.



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