[Wittrs] Re: Dancing Dualisms: Searlean Moves and Cartesian Moves

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 07:20:51 -0700 (PDT)

As I've written to Joe, it seems to me that we can characterize a view as
dualistic iff it entails a view of the mental as non-physical/immaterial.
Searle's philosophy does not meet that criterion and you have not shown me
that Dennett proves otherwise. In fact you have not shown me that Dennett 
even claims otherwise.

I understand Dennett argues against what he calls Cartesian *materialism*, a 
position distinct from both Cartesian substance dualism and property 
dualism. I wonder if Dennett considers Searle's view an example of Cartesian 



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