[Wittrs] Re: Dancing Dualisms: Searlean Moves and Cartesian Moves

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 13:35:08 -0700 (PDT)

--- On Fri, 3/26/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>> I want to know if Dennett believes the CRA makes sense
>> only if one considers mental phenomena as evidence of
>> NON-physical substances of properties. Does he?
> My view is yes, based on his text though, again, he does
> not lay out a formal argument as I have done. 

You have not so far as I can tell argued that one must in order to accept the 
CRA have a conception of mental phenomena as *non-physical*, nor have you 
explained any assumed argument that Dennett has to that effect. 

I feel inclined to defend Searle against charges of explicit or implicit 
dualism, whether they come from you or from Dennett, but again I do not take 
seriously any definition of dualism that does not entail non-physical 
properties or substances. 

As Searle noted somewhere in one of his books, one can hold his views while 
remaining a thorough-going materialist. I agree, and I see no reason to think 
his views on the CRA count as an exception to that rule.

At most, Searle might meet Dennett's definition of a so-called "Cartesian 
materialist". But I suspect Dennett, as an eliminative materialist, mainly uses 
the Cartesian materialist label to describe non-eliminative materialists like 
Searle who affirm the reality of conscious intentionality.



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