[Wittrs] Re: Dancing Dualisms: Searlean Moves and Cartesian Moves

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 12:05:20 -0700 (PDT)


> I have not aimed to show you that Dennett proves anything. 

You have pointed out that Dennett suggests that to accept the conclusion of the 
CRA one must have a Cartesian conception of mind, and I want to get to the 
bottom of that. 

If Dennett truly considers Searle a closet dualist of some sort then I want to 
know exactly what he means. I want to know if Dennett believes the CRA makes 
sense only if one considers mental phenomena as evidence of NON-physical 
substances of properties. Does he?

I do not take seriously any definition of dualism that does not entail 
non-physical properties or substances. 

> Where have you seen [Dennett's] argument
> against "Cartesian materialism"? We could take a look if
> it's accessible on-line and come to some opinions on that.

"Cartesian materialism is the view that there is a crucial finish line or 
boundary somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival 
equals the order of "presentation" in experience because what happens there is 
what you are conscious of. [...] Many theorists would insist that they have 
explicitly rejected such an obviously bad idea. But [...] the persuasive 
imagery of the Cartesian Theater keeps coming back to haunt us—laypeople and 
scientists alike—even after its ghostly dualism has been denounced and 

- Dennett quoted in the following wikipedia article:

Multiple Drafts Model


Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Other related posts: