[Wittrs] Re: Current Brain Research: Causal Model?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2010 01:09:15 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > I don't know what everyone on the list believes. I do know that there
> are some ways of thinking that some of us
> > have about consciousness that imply or reflect the idea that
> consciousness is irreducible and THAT, on my view, is dualism.
>
> My take: We are all Dualists in that we all agree that "mind is
> different from brain" in some sense.
That's not the sense I have in mind in characterizing Searle's implicit
position. That words have different senses doesn't mean that meanings (as in
particular uses/applications) are irrelevant.
>You agree that mental statements
> can't be translated or substituted for physical descriptions of brain
> activity, as do I and Joe. Also, we all agree that brain is vital, the
> basis of, essential to mental activity. Where we differ: HOW TO
> CONCEPTUALIZE THE RELATION OF BRAIN AND MIND.
>
> JOE: I'm not sure. Since he points out mind and brain are different, he
> allows for a causal relation. But I haven't read where he specifies the
> causal process.
>
> Stuart: Holds..." it is probably a mistake to presume consciousness is
> irreducible"...Because..."it is accountable as a system level property"
> Put that way, the brain system produces or makes consciousness (the way
> the bone marrow makes blood) and thus he is using "cause" in the sense
> of produce.
>
Actually that pretty well sums up Searle's explicit position, a position I
generally agree with.
> Bruce: Agrees with Stuart that specific brain activity is the basis for
> producing consciousness but finds the bone-marrow analogy inadequate.
> Blood is simply a product of bone marrow. It's relationship to marrow is
> that it is a re-arrangement of bone molecules. There is an underlying
> material continuity. In contrast, there is no continuity or even contact
> with "being conscious" and brain activity.
>
Is the color red (a property of some things but not of others) not the result
(as in caused by) the occurrence of a certain type of something we describe as
"waves" at a certain frequency impinging on the sensory receptors in our
sensing apparatus? If so what is "caused"? The way we see the color depends on
physical events of a certain type occurring in a certain way. So the redness is
caused by the events. But 'seeing the redness' also refers to the occurrence of
something in the perceiver in response to the physical events already
described. The question is whether, when we get to the seeing part, we now have
to depart from the physical descriptions to something else.
If the brain is essential to the occurrence of the mind, of the perceiving, if
it is what's needed for the conversion (or whatever we want to call it) of the
physical phenomena to sensation in a perceiver to occur, the question is
whether the physicality of the brain matters in the same way the physicality of
the events being perceived matters.
> > Give or take though I wouldn't necessarily speak of it as a "causal
> chain"
>
> If brain activity causes mind, in the scientific sense, then, in
> principle, there must be a causal chain.
>
There are lots of meanings of "cause". I have already explained how Searle's
use (that the wetness of water is called by the behavior of its constituent
parts at a micro level under certain ambient conditions) is applicable here.
The wetness of the water is not different from those constituent parts and
their behavior, it is just a different level of observation on which the same
thing is manifested. Yet we can quite readily see how giving an answer about
the molecular behavior of water's constituents IS to give a causal account.
Of course one might say, no, I mean why is there water (or wetness) in the
world at all. And then different kinds of accounts might be essayed insofar as
such a question could even be answered. I suspect it would be harder to answer
for wetness (because it would seem so odd) than for water since one could give
an account of how water occurs on Earth, where it comes from, what forms it,
etc. But this would be to confuse what is asked for when a "cause" is sought.
I think you persistently mix up the different ideas of "cause" here, Bruce, and
in so doing are attached to this idea that since consciousness isn't some
physical thing, therefore no physical cause can be invoked. But then we have
the problem of brains again, i.e., that consciousness is seen to be entirely
dependent on a certain kind of brain in good working order, etc.
> > since the "cause" I have in mind is more akin to water's wetness and
> its molecular make up.
>
> The cause "you have mind" is what "I have in mind" and water molecules
> causing a sense of wetness is a perfect example.
>
No, as someone else once mentioned here, the question of a "sense of wetness"
is a different (albeit related) issue. That is, we can speak of wetness in
terms of all its observable characteristics: turns dirt to mud, softens certain
materials, rusts others, dissolves salts, causes chills AND feels a certain way
on our skin. But you, it seems, want to focus on the last way exclusively.
That, of course, mixes our questions because now you are talking not about
wetness but about sensation.
While it's true that whatever causes this wetness causes this sensation in us
when we come into contact with it, the sensation is a new and different
question, one that is not addressed by the question of what is the cause of
water's wetness?
> > In that case, there isn't what you might want to call a "causal chain"
>
> Well, no chain, no causation.
Wrong sense of causation. I repeat, there is more than one sense. Aristotle
identified four. I think we could go him some better and, with Wittgenstein,
identify what could well be an indefinite number of possible uses. To talk this
out here, though, what is important is that we nail down what we each have in
mind.
>Just at what point and HOW does the
> original stimulation of molecules cause a person to feel wet. I think
> this question puts the causal theorist in an uncomfortable position when
> he recognizes that the "effect" is not simply "a feel of wetness" but a
> "person feeling wet" and where the hell did the person comes from?
>
This confuses the issues. We can speak of wetness as caused by the molecular
behavior of H2O molecules under certain ambient conditions and the feeling of
wetness on contact with it as the caused by the interplay of certain brain
events. The same idea of "cause" is in use here, but not the same phenomenon
(even if we recognize the one phenomenon, under certain conditions, via the
other)!
> > Again, I think the notion of a "causal chain" is the wrong picture.
>
> A causal notion without a chain sounds like not facing up to ones
> presuppositions. OK. Tell me more about your sense of causation.
>
Or just using a different application of "cause".
> > What we are dealing with are different levels of occurrence and
> "observation",
>
> Right! How the heck can you causally connect your observation of my fMRI
> and my remarks?
>
In the same way those researchers into language occurrence in brains that I
described earlier do it. As to what brings about the mental life of any given
brain, Dehaene's approach looks exceedingly promising, i.e., by isolating and
tracking particular brain operations.
> > not physical interactions on the same level.
>
> In fact, not physical interactions at all. Your observation doesn't
> physically interact with my experience. That's the rub.
>
> bruce
>
>
I think you're just fixated on one notion of "cause" and unable or unwilling to
give it up for a broader use of the term that's more in keeping with how we
actually speak.
SWM
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