[Wittrs] Re: Cayuse- Is Consciousness empirical?

  • From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2010 22:02:34 -0000

BruceD wrote:
I experience my consciousness

I see the monitor screen.
I hear the hum of the PC fan.
I smell the mug of coffee on the table beside me.
But I have no idea what it means to say "I experience my consciousness".
How are you using the words "experience" and "consciousness" here?

and experience is all about the empirical.

I understand "the empirical" to refer to a /category/ of the data of
conscious experience, specifically that category that is taken to appear
in conscious experience through the operation of the sense organs.
Consequently it seems incongruous to me to claim that conscious
experience is "all about" the empirical. There is more to the data of
conscious experience than just the empirical.

The "sensory-motor loop" is a technical term that refers some to
theoretical abstractions psychologists use to make sense out of
consciousness. How can it be unrelated?

That loop is part of our conceptual model of an organism's ability to
process information. According to that model, there is no reason why that information processing cannot go on "in the dark" as Chalmers puts it
-- i.e. completely unaccompanied by conscious experience of any aspect of
that data. If you specify some aspect of behavior as being dependent upon
conscious experience, then the question must be asked why that aspect of
behavior cannot simply be another layer of information processing and
therefore cannot be independent of conscious experience.

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