"Cayuse" wrote: the claim that the physical organism"experiences the data of experience" is one that has no application
because, as I said, the "I" often doesn't refer to the physical organism. So we agree. Where do we disagree? Do you hold that experience can't be accounted for objectively? If so, why?
I hold that conscious experience can't be accounted for objectively since it is not an objective phenomenon. Neither, incidentally, is it a subjective phenomenon. Rather phenomena (the data or contents of conscious experience) are what conscious experience consists of, and those phenomena are categorized as objective or subjective.
"Cayuse" wrote: I have no problem with the use of the word "I" to denote the physical organism as it refers to itself, and with the word "conscious" to denote responsivity to environmental stimuli, but I don't see any application to the claim that the physical organism is "consciously experiencing" the data supplied by its sense organs.
Yes, it is me, Bruce, that is conscious, not the physical body of Bruce and there is no of getting from sense data to consciousness unless you hold that sense data cause the brain to cause consciousness. I've spent the last two years dissecting that possibility.
Sense data are part of the data of conscious experience, and if by your comment that "there is no getting from sense data to consciousness" you mean that the part cannot cause the whole (since sense data are a category of the data of conscious experience) then to that extent we agree. Where we disagree is the claim that there is /anything at all/ that consciously experiences, specifically something that can be named. Naming is a process that goes on within the data of conscious experience, performed by entities appearing within that data, with reference to perceived and conceptual entities and processes appearing within that data.
Bruce asked:How about a fictional Bruce, neither dead nor alive? When you say"he is loyal", are you referring to his body?"Cayuse" wrote: Yes, as long as the fictional Bruce is alive in the fiction.
So fictional bodies are physical?
Fictional bodies are physical in the fiction. BruceD wrote:
I think we should talk about what is and is not physical.
I think it would be fruitless to search for some kind of essence to the word 'physical', but fruitful to /look/ at how the word is used. When I speak of a physical body, I'm speaking of an object that appears in the data supplied by the sense, and that appears in a form that is in many respects measurable. It has a height and a weight, a skin color, a hair color, an eye color, etc.
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