On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 4:09 PM, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > (Kirby writes:) > > "So in that sense I might contend that the meaning of a proper name remains > unsettled and/or "up in the air" or "subject to revision" for an open-ended > period of time, another way of saying "remains subject to change in > principle, or in perpetuity" (sounds like some sort of legal document). ... > It's not intrinsic to the meaning of a proper name that it be "settled" or > "fixed." ... Do you rest easy with this formulation? " > ============================= > (Sean replies:) > ... I do agree. I'm working on a paper, and I think just found the right way > to say it. Here is what a proper name is: it is a set of instructions for > bearer-assignment, amendable after shipment." > You do seem to have a clear set of modalities going, for specifying in what ways to "bind" a name to some object -- to use some shoptalk from computer science. ** I think we should keep in the picture two essential ways in which a name -> object relationship might be affected. The object itself may change, or our perception of it does. It turns out that X was not a real person, or that this suitcase, identified by luggage tag and bar code, does not contain at all what we thought it did. In these examples, the target remains the same, and yet has also changed, perhaps drastically and in a way which strains the original name->object binding (past the breaking point in some cases). In Wittgenstein, you'll get the example of where you think King's College is off to your right, then you suddenly realize it's right ahead. The meaning of King's College has changed in that the target has moved, if only in your perception. Another way in which the name -> object relationship may change, is if we discover that two different names were in fact bound to the same object. It turns out the "Sam's sister" and "Mrs. Walker" are really bound to the same person. That's a context thing of course, as we have millions of identities using "Sam" and/or "Mrs. Walker", which is why your "binding rules" are so critical. There's every potential for missing the relationship i.e. naming the *wrong* object -- lots of our investigations should delve into that possibility. Sometimes changes to an object's attributes may be "devastating" i.e. I think I know what I mean by X, and I've gone around telling people that X is a real person, i.e. built right in to my definition of X is that I'll be able to bind the name "X" to "somebody real". When it turns out there is no X matching my description (I come to this conclusion on my own), then I don't say "I still mean X, it's just that X does not have the attribute of existing". On the contrary, I have to say that my previous use of "X" is now meaningless, is null and void. "I was just speaking nonsense" might be the confession. I bring this up to add a wrinkle to the "amending" process. One may change the name -> object relationship "from either side" as it were. But one may also obliterate or disrupt the relationship. Consider for example the proper name "Epcot". I'd say here we have a good example of a persistent name -> object relationship, not obliterated or disrupted, where there's nevertheless been significant activity on both the name side and the object side. Changes to name: When the word was first coined, it was EPCOT and stood for Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow. That was Walt Disney's grand vision of what this new theme park would be (in Orlando). In choosing to lowercase it to Epcot, the modality was rebranding (changing the brand). Changes to object: The signature building, Spaceship Earth, was decorated with a more retro skin or theme, a giant Mickey Mouse arm sprinkling pixie dust. That arm has since been removed, parts auctioned off on eBay (says WIkipedia) while the theme ride inside, originally scripted by Ray Bradbury, has been modernized under new sponsorship. Name -> Object persistence: In giving this example, I'm giving a sense of the interplay between name and object. Both names and objects are subject to revision, yet we might still claim to be dealing with "the same" relationship throughout the revisionary process. I also sense I'm retreating from any strict name->object nominalism, which I associate with computer logic, Python's in particular, and am going back to saying things like "everything as a signifier". The Spaceship Earth ball is as much caught up in usage patterns as is the moniker "Spaceship Earth", which has its own trajectory in "semantic space" e.g. if "Global University" is used as a rough synonym in some namespace -- language game -- then that changes or "precesses" (spins) its meaning.... Adding the Mickey Mouse arm, then taking it away, changes the meaning of the Spaceship Earth ball (as would destroying it) in a way that's difficult to put one's finger on, but since when were changes in meaning always easy to articulate (I'd like to say "most change goes by without comment" and hope to be understood). In this sense of altering meaning by altering objects, one might say "things are also names" or (more coherently) "language" and "the world" are only distinct by convention, not by divine intervention. Getting back to this cross-roads again... http://coffeeshopsnet.blogspot.com/2009/10/on-wittgensteins-philo.html Good to compare notes with ya. Kirby Related reading: http://www.grunch.net/synergetics/docs/epnote1.html ** a language game: In going: a = 2 we're not saying "a equals 2" so much as "a binds to 2, is a name for the 2 object". The symbol "2" is likewise a name for the "2 object". The symbol "=" is called "the assignment operator" and its purpose is to bind names to objects. two = 2 is akin to two -> 2. ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/