[Wittrs] Re: Bogus Claim 1: Cartesian Dualism Does Not Require Two Kinds of 'Stuff'
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 15:08:09 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> Bogus Claim 1: Cartesian Dualism Does Not Require Two Kinds of 'Stuff'
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >The idea of "ontological basics" covers stuffs, substances, or
> >anything else that one might want to imagine is nonreducible to
> >anything more basic, yet different, than itself.
>
> from which it follows that an ontologically basic substance is an
> ontological basicality; but, that not all ontological basicalities are
> ontologically basic substances.
>
Congratulations. That's why I don't use the term "substance" in referring to
that kind of dualism.
> how then do you show that Searle is a Cartesian dualist, a position
> requiring two ontologically basic substances, which Dennett calls
> 'physical stuff' and 'mind stuff'?
>
I don't say Searle is an explicit proponent of Descartes' philosophy, only that
his position implies that way of thinking about mind. Since Searle doesn't make
this explicit, he doesn't assert belief in it or any of its various
implications. Dennett's point, and mine, is that Searle's position involves a
way of thinking about mind that underlies the kind of dualism Descartes made
famous.
> >>the key move in the Mirsky FUD occurs now.
>
> you note that, according to Searle, consciousness is not ontologically
> reducible to the brain processes that cause it.
I note that Searle distinguishes between ontological claims and reducibility
claims and point out that that is a false distinction since reducibility claims
(involving identification of causes) can also involve ontological claims, i.e.,
the two aren't mutually exclusive. Since Searle makes certain kinds of
reducibility claims, I note that there are ontological implications (despite
his effort to separate ontology claims from the causal question), implications
on which he is being inconsistent in his treatment vis a vis what is seen in
the Chinese Room vs. what he asserts must occur in brains.
> since consciousness,
> according to Searle, *is* causally reducible to those brain processes,
> he's only got one ontologically basic substance, 'physical stuff' in
> Dennett's jargon.
>
That's a reflection of his confused use of "ontological" since he divests
causal claims from having ontological implications but that is an arbitrary
move, unsupported by the actual way a term like ontology gets used.
> consciousness is an ontologically basic phenomenon.
>
Searle certainly thinks so but in doing that he confuses the use of "ontology"
as a way of classifying existents with the use of it as a way of identifying
causal basics.
> >>after counting an ontologically basic substance and an ontologically
> >>basic phenomenon as two ontological basicalities, you redefine
> >>'ontological basic' in mid argument (a genuine equivocation, BTW) so
> >>that anyone with two ontological basicalities is presumed to have two
> >>ontologically basic substances.
>
> >Nope, you simply insist on claiming that to speak of an ontologically
> >basic substance is not the same as to speak of an ontological basic
> >(which could be something called a "substance" or something called
> >something else).
>
> I agree that an ontologically basic substance is an ontological
> basicality.
>
> based on your own definition, I deny that all ontological basicalities
> are ontologically basic substances.
>
I never said they were. That's just another of your manifold misreadings of my
words. Note that, above, I say (when speaking of "ontological basics") the
following: "which could be something called a 'substance' or something called
something else".
Note that I am making no claim that "all ontological basicalities are
ontologically basic substances" which is just another of your false
attributions to me, another of your ubiquitous strawman claims.
If you would calm yourself and stop your desperate hunt to find some kind of
logical error for a moment and actually read and process what I have written, a
lot of this nonsense could be avoided.
> >>voila! substance dualism without any evidence of a second kind of
> >>'stuff'.
>
> >It's not about stuff or substances but about ontological basicness.
>
> for Dennett (as for the rest of the philosophical profession (if it is a
> profession)) Cartesian dualism is interactive substance dualism. it
> requires two ontologically basic substances, which Dennett calls
> 'physical stuff' and 'mind stuff'.
>
Dennett is pointing out where this kind of thinking leads and doing so in order
to raise the point that it is intellectually suspect, given the status of
dualism in today's scientific and philosophical communities.
> I suspect that all list members would be willing to stipulate that
> Searle's position postulates that there is physical stuff; so that's not
> an issue.
>
I would suspect that Searle would not speak in terms of "physical stuff" unless
it was just to note that the stuff we encounter in the world is physical, which
it is. Beyond that, claiming that there is an underlying stuff of some
metaphysically ultimate nature that is the basis of all things physical and
which we should therefore call "physical stuff" would no doubt be something he
would avoid, given his explicit aversion to the dualist thesis.
I think you are here confusing the ordinary use of words like "stuff" and
"substance" with a very specialized philosophical use that is currently in poor
repute among most modern philosophical thinkers in any case. If one wants to
spend one's philosophical time immersed in 17th, 18th or 19th century world
views, then one may well think that talk of underlying substances or stuff is
the way to go, but, frankly, I find it all rather pointless and inapplicable to
today's way of understanding things.
> you've never made any attempt to show that Searle's position postulates
> that there is a second ontologically basic substance such as that which
> Dennett calls 'mind stuff'. consequently, the problem for you is to find
> some way to classify Searle as a Cartesian dualist although Searlean
> philosophy does not postulate a second ontologically basic substance.
>
You really just keep beating the same horse no matter what I say, don't you?
Look, again, I said Searle's CRA is implicitly dualist in the way that we
normally think of substance (not property) dualism and that I think it is
archaic and outmoded in today's world to harp on the "substance" aspect since a
better way of describing this is in terms of "ontological basics" whatever they
are. (Thus no thesis about any unique underlying stuff or substance is
implied.) I have also said that Dennett's critique of Searle reveals that he
notices the same thing.
I posted text on this list from Dennett's book, Consciousness Explained,
showing that Dennett did actually make this claim explicitly, in response to
your claim that he hadn't. The text I posted thus supports my point about
Dennett's critique of Searle's CRA.
Moreover, the point I made had to do with the implications of Searle's
argument, not with his explicit statements so the issue has to do with the way
of thinking about consciousness found in his argument, not with whether he
meets the test, in his explicit writings of being a disciple of Descartes and
thus Cartesian in that sense.
Further, I made the additional point that Dennett's reference was to a way of
thinking, too, and not to a claim that Searle is an acolyte of Descartes.
> you do it by equivocating as to the definition of 'ontological basic'.
>
I have been very specific as to what I mean. What you call an "equivocation"
reflects a (deliberate?) misreading on your part of what I actually said (see
above for the detail). At best your claim is a strawman argument, at worst it's
a failure of comprehension.
> [BTW, Stuart, this is a real equivocation because a single phrase
> changes its meaning as the argument proceeds.]
>
Except it doesn't in my use.
Note that my point about Searle's equivocation hinges on Searle's own
documented insistence that the third premise is "conceptually true". Since the
only reading of that premise that is conceptually true is the non-identity
claim, he is obviously reading it that way to get his claim of truth for the
premise, even though the other reading, the non-causal claim, which isn't
conceptually true (unless non-identity implies non-causality, which it doesn't)
is what's required to be true for the conclusions based on the three premises
to be.
> >you're just wasting my time by insisting on a particular vocabulary.
>
> you are wasting everyone's time by translating philosophical ideas into
> a defective vocabulary, defective because it contains the equivocation
> you need for your linguistic sleight of hand.
>
> Joe
Accusations of that sort are cheap, and cheaply made, but pointless when they
aren't supported by the facts -- as they manifestly aren't in this case.
To make it easier for you, here's a quick recap of some of your misreadings and
therefore false imputations concerning my positions taken from the text in this
very post above:
Joe: ". . . based on your own definition, I deny that all ontological
basicalities are ontologically basic substances."
My response: ". . . Note that, above, I say (when speaking of 'ontological
basics') the following: 'which could be something called a 'substance' or
something called something else'.
"Note that I am making no claim that 'all ontological basicalities are
ontologically basic substances' which is just another of your false
attributions to me, another of your ubiquitous strawman claims."
For more of your misreadings, Joe, feel free to refer to other comments I've
provided above.
Really, it is getting rather tiresome to constantly have to be pointing out
that you are imputing claims to me that I never made so you can argue that I'm
wrong. Either you really don't understand what I've been saying or you simply
choose not to. Either way, your points here are grossly mistaken. Perhaps at
some stage in these discussions you will recognize that and start discussing
what I have really said rather than what you want to believe (or want others to
believe) I have said.
Or not. You haven't done it yet so there's probably little reason to hope this
will change.
SWM
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