[Wittrs] Re: . . . Classifying Searle
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 17:21:03 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> I consider Searle's philosophy of mind a flavor of non-reductive physicalism,
> clearly distinct from any form of dualism. He distinguishes himself from
> dualists by denying the existence of any non-physical substances or
> properties.
>
Joe notes that to be a non-reductive physicalist is distinct from being a
Cartesian dualist and thereby undermines my premise that 'to think that
consciousness cannot be broken down to constituents that are not, themselves,
conscious is to be a Cartesian dualist'.
But if a "non-reductive physicalist" is just defined as what Searle is, then
the issue Joe's point is circular because his denial of the truth of that
premise hinges on the stipulation that Searle's position isn't that when the
point of my argument, which includes that premise, is to demonstrate that
Searle's position IS that!
> > opinions differ as to whether he explains this phenomenological dualism
> > by postulating a property dualism or a dualism of ontological basicness
>
> Neither, I would say.
>
> As Searle puts it, we lose the concept of consciousness when we deny its
> first-person ontology. But this is not to say we could not do the reduction
> if we so desired -- only that it would make no sense to do so.
>
One can recognize the utility of speaking about experiences and experiencing in
first person terms without denying the utility of speaking about these things
in terms of third person descriptions that have to do with causal relations
between experiences and brains. It's an unnecessary confusion to suppose that
the potency of first person talk about experience makes any difference to the
value of third person descriptions of causal factors.
> Somewhere in his writings he cites mud as an example: when we reduce mud to
> water and soil, we lose the concept of muddiness, and muddiness is what
> interests us when we use word mud. In the case of mud, then, it makes no
> sense to do a reduction. Likewise with consciousness. We can reduce it to
> third-person physics (as in identity theory), but in reducing it we lose the
> concept that interests us.
>
> -gts
>
Of course there are levels of observation and analysis. That is inherent in the
scientific game.
And of course "mud" refers to certain features we experience in our everyday
lives while "a mixture of water and soil" may have other applications (though,
of course, we ALSO experience the outcome of mixing water and soil as well as
the value of knowing what such a mixture yields).
We could, of course, also refer to the more complex molecular behavior of the
mixture we call "mud" just as we could refer to the behavior of H2O molecules
under certain ambient conditions as being the referent of (what we call)
"water" or "wetness". But the referents of "H2O molecules", etc., are
theoretical constructs, ideas at some remove from our actual experience of the
phenomena in question. So they will have value in certain contexts but a value
that diminishes, sometimes to the point of non-existence, in other contexts.
How useful is it likely to be after all to substitute theoretical descriptions
of molecular behaviors in ordinary discussion that hinges on referencing
certain features in the world that we experience as direct perceptions?
That we may use different language games to refer to different levels of
operation in some cases doesn't preclude referring to different levels in the
same games, too. Even Searle agrees that brains "cause" consciousness. He just
lapses into confusion when he wants to talk about what consciousness is, as
though the fact that it is experienced as experience (in a way exclusive to
each subject) means that one cannot describe it in terms of constituents that
aren't themselves, conscious -- even if one means to talk about causes. But
then he stumbles when he doesn't notice that if brains really do cause
consciousness in a perfectly physical way there is no reason, in principle,
that computational processes running on computers cannot do so as well (even if
there may be some empirical reason they cannot).
Searle makes much of the claim that consciousness must depend on the biological
uniqueness of brains in that article you cited, Gordon, but he provides no
reason to assume that there is something that brains have about them that
computers lack except for his argument that computational processes running on
computers ("programs") just can't cause consciousness, though THAT assertion
finally hinges on nothing more than the claim that we know they can't because,
looking inside the CR, there is no consciousness evident!
But THAT only counts as a reason to believe they can't if we really need to
think consciousness must be evident in the constituents of the CR for them to
have a causal relation to consciousness (in the way brains or their processes
are said by Searle to cause consciousness). And we don't have that, UNLESS WE
ALREADY THINK THAT CONSCIOUSNESS CANNOT BE CONSTITUTED BY WHAT ISN'T CONSCIOUS.
But then the same problem computers have applies to brains!
But even Searle agrees that brains do it! He's just stuck here in a
contradiction that is very deepseated in his argument.
SWM
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