[C] [Wittrs] Wittgenstein Meets Searle and Dennett
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 04 Apr 2010 14:35:57 -0000
Does anyone have an opinion on where Wittgenstein would have come down on the
Searle-Dennett dispute which has been raging for some time now on this list
(and some earlier ones)?
Both Searle and Dennett refer with respect to the work and contributions of
Wittgenstein. Does either of their positions fit better with a Wittgensteinian
view?
Searle is on record as saying Wittgenstein made a "massive mistake" by
disconnecting philosophy from theorizing so we know there is at least some
disagreement between the two thinkers and yet much of his work (from talk of
"Backgrounds" to his emphasis on the need to break out of existing linguistic
categorizations when talking about mind to his general focus on the role and
importance of language, itself, in how we think about things seem highly
reminiscent of Wittgensteinian thought).
Dennett, for his part, has been accused of offering a behaviorist account (or a
behaviorist-consistent account) of mind becaue he wants to focus on the way(s)
in which the brain's processes interact to produce consciousness rather than on
the subjectness of consciousness itself and, of course, Wittgenstein has
similarly been accounted a behaviorist by some. Moreover, Dennett has, as I
recall, explicitly referenced Wittgenstein in terms of some of his ideas about
consciousness, specifically re: the different way we use our terms vis a vis
conscious phenomena (e.g., noting that assignment of intentionality is more
about the stance or orientation we take to certain kinds of entities than it is
about the occurrence in the entity of some specific phenomenon).
Being of a Wittgensteinian bent myself, I have often seen echoes of
Wittgenstein in the claims of both later philosophers. And yet there's no
denying that both are doing things Wittgenstein eschewed and delving into areas
he seemed to prefer to stay clear of. Both Searle and Dennett feel perfectly at
home in considering and developing theoretical accounts of mind and in making
more or less rigorous arguments (with Searle hewing to a more classically tight
approach in that he casts some of his claims syllogistically). Wittgenstein, of
course, seemed to prefer to avoid formal argumentation and debate, even in his
earlier years, in favor of aphorisms and articulated insights about the way
things are. From these one can develop a picture of how the world works on, at
least, a linguistic/conceptual level though, because Wittgenstein was
anti-theory in his approach, any debate about his pictures of things seems to
devolve into competing insights which one's interlocutors either see or don't
see.
But then, in the end, isn't all argumentation like that anyway? After all, as
we've seen repeatedly on this list, one can argue from premises to conclusions
until one is blue in the face and yet, in the end, if the other side in the
dispute doesn't see it (for whatever reason), no progress can be made. So in
some ways, Wittgenstein just tossed the contrivance of logical argument/debate
aside in favor of getting right to the issue of what we get, what we understand.
And yet very creditable philosophers, like Searle and Dennett, persist in
following a different, more traditional philosophical path. Would Wittgenstein
have simply waved them off and moved on or would that have been, as so many on
lists like these like to say, just so much "hand waving"?
Would Wittgenstein have found in Searle and Dennett kindred spirits or just
hopelessly retrogressive thinkers after the revolution in philosophical inquiry
he hand waved in?
SWM
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