Henry LeRoy Finch is another author who has worked in this area, especially on the meaning of the word "I" which, when considered operationally, need not point to any "thing" (any "cogito") as an object, for its meaning. He wrote on both the Tractatus and the PI. In the Tractatus, there's no cogito that's "in the world" as one more thing to be mapped or symbolized by the prototype nouns (atomic elements of propositions, conceived as descriptive). "I" is not a noun, not a name. This theme seems continued in the PI to the extent that a challenge to solipsism is to investigate the meaning of this word "I" and its supposed association with an "owner" of some kind. In TLP he says there's something right about solipsism (5.62c), and that's worth discussing. What's right about it? Kirby On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:04 AM, Cayuse <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > The following article discusses solipsism from the perspective of a > certain interpretation of Wittgenstein (mainly the PI). That interpretation > seems to me to be at odds with Wittgenstein's use of the word 'solipsism' in > his Tractatus, and more consistent with the Problem of Other Minds than with > the problem of solipsism as Descartes described it. I'm left unsure about my > own interpretation of Wittgenstein on this, so I'd like to ask what others > think of the article's interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of solipsism: > > http://www.iep.utm.edu/solipsis/ >