[C] [Wittrs] Re: Solipsism

  • From: kirby urner <kirby.urner@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2011 14:49:18 -0800

Henry LeRoy Finch is another author who has worked in this area, especially
on the meaning of the word "I" which, when considered operationally, need
not point to any "thing" (any "cogito") as an object, for its meaning.  He
wrote on both the Tractatus and the PI.

In the Tractatus, there's no cogito that's "in the world" as one more thing
to be mapped or symbolized by the prototype nouns (atomic elements of
propositions, conceived as descriptive).  "I" is not a noun, not a name.

This theme seems continued in the PI to the extent that a challenge to
solipsism is to investigate the meaning of this word "I" and its supposed
association with an "owner" of some kind.

In TLP he says there's something right about solipsism (5.62c), and that's
worth discussing.  What's right about it?


On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:04 AM, Cayuse <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>  The following article discusses solipsism from the perspective of a
> certain interpretation of Wittgenstein (mainly the PI). That interpretation
> seems to me to be at odds with Wittgenstein's use of the word 'solipsism' in
> his Tractatus, and more consistent with the Problem of Other Minds than with
> the problem of solipsism as Descartes described it. I'm left unsure about my
> own interpretation of Wittgenstein on this, so I'd like to ask what others
> think of the article's interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of solipsism:
> http://www.iep.utm.edu/solipsis/

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