[C] [Wittrs] Re: Proper Names --Wittgenstein, Russell, Kripke

  • From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 05 Feb 2010 06:43:30 -0000

SW,

I'll start with an observation: I am not entirely clear about what you mean in 
distinguishing between "bearer-calls" and "bearer-assignments", so I can 
neither confirm nor deny when you impute to me the view that a name can only 
ever be the former and never the latter.  I do however suppose that that is 
probably not right because I would always wish to emphasize the multiplicity of 
ways in which names are used.  So, a claim like "names are always... and 
never...", however one might fill in the blanks, is just not something I'd be 
inclined to say.

(It may be that the "telephone-conversation format", as you put it, gave the 
misleading impression that I was debating you.  And that therefore I was 
advancing some position contrary to your own.  When I address a remark to 
something you've written, offer a clarification or observation, it is meant to 
be pertinent.  But if you do not find the remarks pertinent, so be it.  Perhaps 
I have misunderstood you.  In which case, it is entirely possible that we 
aren't disagreeing.  "Reading tea leaves" to ascertain what contrary position I 
am trying to advance (presumably in some subtle or covert way) would only be 
counter-productive.  I find "these little pithy sort of things" to be the best 
way for me to proceed but if they aren't helpful, I understand.)

Now, you say, "It seems that you want to say that a name could never set forth 
criteria to ASSIGN its bearer, and must always, instead, always be the thing 
that a particular bearer calls to."  (Forgive the "telephone-conversation 
format", but how else am I to make clear what I am addressing?)

A few points:

Names don't "set forth criteria".  Language users do that.  And the rules 
language users follow in correctly using a name include various criteria.  Some 
of these criteria may in some cases be used to determine the bearer to whom the 
name is assigned, the bearer to whom the name is rightly applied.
The criteria may work just fine but in some cases they may lead to ambiguity.  
That does not make them any less serviceable in the many cases where no such 
problems arise.

A name is not it's bearer.  I have ever even suggested such a thing.  In fact, 
I've explicitly rejected it. A name is often used to indicate it's bearer and 
when we use names to express propositions, we are typically talking about the 
bearer, not about the name.  "'Sally' has 5 letters" is about the name.  "Sally 
has 5 children" is about the person, the bearer of the name.  "Sally is the 
eldest daughter of..." may be used to tell us something about Sally or it may 
be offerred as a rule for individuating Sally, a rule for the correct use of 
the name "Sally".  It depends on the context.

An explanation like, "Sally is the eldest daughter of..." may be treated as a 
rule and in typical cases will serve just fine.  But we can always imagine 
atypical cases, e.g. where her parents had another daughter whom they had put 
up for adoption and never again discussed or where Sally had been kidnapped and 
unlawfully adopted.

Further, I am not saying that a name always has a bearer or that a name is 
always taught by indicating its bearer.

Additional point.  I never denied that nicknames are names.  I don't know why 
you would impute this to me.  I said that nicknames are not proper names as 
"proper name" is used in ordinary English.  If someone asks your name and you 
give them a nickname they might well clarify, "I mean your proper name..."  
Still, they are names.  And in philosophical discussions, "proper name" is 
often used in a wider sense than in ordinary English.

I also never denied that titles can be treated as names.

And I never denied that the hyperbolic use of names is still a use of names: I 
merely emphasized some distinctions between different cases.

And if you can set forth some criteria for neatly distinguishing between the 
Moses of tradition and the Moses of history, I'd welcome you to share.  I have 
not denied that we might come up with a basis for such a distinction and that 
such a distinction might be well-motivated.  I merely inquired as to what was 
on the table in this regard.

As for Moses, there are various reasons we might have for saying that Moses did 
not exist.  My only point was that the boundary between those cases where we 
should say that a particular account did not accurately describe Moses and 
those cases where we should say that Moses did not exist is not clearly 
deetermined in advance.  The talk about Moses going by a different name 
("Ghandalf") is completely beside the point.  On the contrary, I would readily 
acknowledge the possibility that a person who did various things whom we call 
"Moses" might have been called an entirely different name by his contemporaries.

Regarding "That's not Jane anymore", I don't dispute that such a usage is part 
of our language.  I was emphasizing that there is a distinction between a 
person who comes to behave in a way that no longer conforms to our prior 
expectations or a person who turns out never to have been the sort of person 
we'd supposed (where we might be inclined to engage in the hyperbole you 
describe) and the person who is only known to us by way of various descriptions 
and narratives whose existence we come to question as we discover that the 
various narratives may be substantially false.

I never said that the use of hyperbole was incorrect, never denied that it 
occurs.  Comparing me to a librarian is irrelevant.  (Besides: are librarians 
noted for making such judgments?  I thought the stereotype was the schoolmarm.  
I've known a few librarians and many were fond of wordplay and colorful 
tropes.)  I'm not laying down a standard of correctness.  I am pointing out 
distinctions between cases.  And that certainly is Wittgensteinian.

And just for the record, I also don't deny the "Jane is Rhonda" trope (although 
it's actually seldom presented that way).  "Dick Cheney is Darth Vader" is the 
most recent and widely heard example that comes to mind, though that also 
involves a fictional name.  Calling people "Hitler" is all too common (and 
offensive for a range of reasons).  Calling someone "Freud" who insists on 
ascribing various views and motives to people on meagre evidence is another 
popular example that seems to me oddly appropriate at the moment.

I did not equate the nickname "Messy Marvin" with the sentence "Marvin is 
messy".  On the contrary, I emphasized that Marvin might not live down the 
nickname "Messy Marvin" even after he's cleaned up his act, even after the 
nickname is no longer apt.  And I emphasized that Tiny might actually be a big 
guy, so the aptness of a nickname might be a matter of irony.

"Bachelor" is not a tautology.  I don't know why you persist in referring to 
individual words or referring expressions as tautologies.  They are not 
tautologies by any of the uses of that word with which I am familiar, because 
every use of "tautology" I know of applies to propositions and to being true.  
A word, a name, a referring expression, or a descriptive phrase are none of 
them propositions and true and false do not apply to them except as they are 
used to form propositions.

"Class valedictorian" can be and is treated as a name and uniquely identifies 
in the context of a graduation ceremony or a class reunion.  In other contexts, 
it does not uniquely identify.  Just as "the President" is regularly used as 
the name of a single individual in the US, though if you go outside the US or 
are writing history or if you are attending a meeting of a companies board of 
directors, it would no longer be able to function in that way.

Where did I deny that a number assignment could function as a name?  You've 
objected to the "telephone-conversation format", but it at least has the virtue 
of letting someone know the basis on which a position is being imputed to them. 
 I'd also note that you keep imputing to me various positions I do not hold and 
have never advanced while at the same time ignoring a great deal of what I 
actually did say.

The phrase "create bearers" for what I am guessing is individuation of a bearer 
and assignment of a name to the bearer is unfortunate.  But I find many of the 
phrases you've coined here to be unfortunate in various ways.

With regard to my examples of identical twins, cloning and so forth: my point 
was both to emphasize similarities and differences between the different cases 
you were offering and where they potentially break down.  And the fact that we 
can and do treat the linking of a name to a DNA profile as a rule but are yet 
prepared to revise our judgment in certain cases is as germane as 
Wittgenstein's own remarks with which he concludes with the simile of the 
four-legged table.  It is entirely germane to the shifts between symptoms and 
criteria (to which Wittgenstein alludes in subsequent remarks) and to the shift 
that happens when we move from treating a proposition as a statement of fact 
and as the expression of a rule.

Regarding pointing, you've simply called my points "poor" without in any way 
specifying how.  You said, "I don't even know what you are talking about," and 
while that may indicate that my points were poorly expressed or even that I 
don't have a point at all, I would think you'd be more circumspect in assuming 
that points you didn't understand were "poor".

The points I was raising do not concern PI 38 or 43 so much as 28, 29, 30, and 
33.

I wasn't planning to get into any disputes between you and GS and will probably 
not bother with looking into past discussions on this, though I do thank you 
for providing the link.  I've learned my lesson on that score as you're likely 
well aware.  If the role of "brain" talk becomes relevant, we may revisit it.

I understood perfectly well the explicit point that "Excalibur" does not become 
meaningless when the sword is destroyed.  I was pointing out the additional 
(and not explicit) point in using the mythological example.  Wittgenstein could 
have chosen historical examples of artifacts that had been destroyed to make 
the first point but he chose the example from legend to suggest to a close 
reader the latter point as well, foreshadowing later discussions.  You infer 
that because I point out the second point, I must be denying the first and 
therefore have misunderstood.   I don't think such an inference was warranted.  
In any case, it was mistaken.

I also stand by my assertion that the primary role of introducing the Excaliber 
example is to illustrate a view that he proceeds to challenge, namely the view 
that there must be ultimate names for simples.  And again, this is not to deny 
the point that the name "Excalibur" does not become meaningless when the sword 
is destroyed, but the "simples" view doesn't claim that either.  It is only 
once the "simples" view is challenged that the way is opened to the insight 
comparing "meaning" and "use".

JPDeMouy

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