[C] [Wittrs] Re: Proper Names --Wittgenstein, Russell, Kripke

  • From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 06 Feb 2010 05:55:55 -0000

SW,

First, thank you for the follow-ups.  They were particularly helpful because as 
I read the main letter, I was already noting some of the problems you sought to 
address in the follow-ups.  (Fortunately, I am not one to dash off a reply 
while I am still in the middle of reading, telephone format notwithstanding.)  
This is reassuring because the fact that you were seeing some of the 
difficulties I saw lets me know that I am not completely misunderstanding you.

On the matter of tautologies:

"Tautology" was originally a term in rhetoric referring to expressions (not 
individual words!) that are redundant.  Putative examples include: "first 
introduced", "planning ahead", and "unsolved mystery".  A common form of this 
is found with acronyms, e.g. "VIN number", "PIN number", "UPC code", "HIV 
virus", and so forth.

"Tautology" was introduced into logic with Wittgenstein's Tractatus.  Here the 
idea was that some compound sentences (again, not individual words!) were true 
whatever the truth-values of their constituent propositions.  This was 
demonstrated by the method of truth-tables.  In the Tractatus view, all 
necessary truths could be analyzed into tautologies in that sense but issues 
like the color exclusion problem rendered this problematic and it was rejected. 
 Now, most logicians distinguish between tautologies as a subset of logical 
validities but many use "tautology" more loosely in logical and philosophical 
contexts.  Still, not so loosely as to call a word by itself a tautology!

(Classic example of a tautology: "It is either raining or it is not raining."  
On the textbook view, this is true regardless of what the weather might say.  
It is a remark about logic not about meteorology.  And it is no special feature 
of the word "raining" that this would be a tautology.  However, note also: if 
there is a heavy mist, one might be inclined to reject either the assertion 
that it is raining or that it is not raining!)

Now, the analysis of "bachelor" as, e.g. "unmarried adult human male" would 
show that a sentence like, "If John is a bachelor, then John is not married", 
is in fact a tautology, i.e. "If John is not married, is human, is an adult, 
and is male, then John is not married."  But strictly speaking, only the 
analyzed sentence is a tautology.

The sentence "A bachelor is an unmarried adult human male" (or some variation 
of that) is a textbook example, not of a tautology, but of an analytic truth.  
Analytic truths have been variously glossed as sentences in which the predicate 
is contained in the subject (where the container model is suspect) or as true 
in virtue of the meaning of the constituent terms (which suggests the 
meaning-body picture criticized by Wittgenstein.  Note: he does not speak of 
analytic truths and it is not a mere stylistic quirk that he favors expressions 
like "grammatical remarks".)

(Incidentaly, it would be odd - perhaps even blasphemous - to call the Pope a 
bachelor.  But perhaps he is married to The Church.  Or to God.  And should we 
say that in prehistoric times, before the institution of marriage, all men were 
bachelors?  That would at least be rather peculiar, which is not to say 
incorrect.)

In any event, the point is that standard accounts of both tautologies and 
analytic truths refer to sentences, propositions, or statements, not to 
individual words.

We might say that "bachelor" is an example of a word that can be given an 
analytic definition (an idea related to that of analytic truths but not 
strictly committed to it) but whether a word can be given an analytic 
definition is an open question for people who engage in such activities.  It is 
a subject of some debate.  Whereas the point that if an analytic definition is 
valid, then certain sentences will be analytic truths, is not disputed.  
(Assuming one grants even the idea of "analytic truths".)

(I know of no counter-example to various definitions of "bachelor" that would 
refute the sentence, "If John is a bachelor, then John is not married."  That 
is: I know of no counter-example to suggest that being married wouldn't 
preclude being a bachelor.  But various counter-examples do challenge whether 
even satisfying all of the putative conditions would always qualify one for 
bachelorhood.)

I can say, recalling various things I've read, looking through references 
available to me at the moment, and searching online, I cannot find the claim 
that the word "bachelor" is a tautology.  The definition of bachelor is a 
classic example of an analytic truth and might be loosely called a tautology, 
but there is quite a difference between a word and a definition.  (A definition 
might consist of a single word, i.e. a synonym of the word to be defined, but 
then you still have two words: the word defined and its synonym.  Along with 
some form of copula, perhaps a typographical convention like a colon.)

Sentences, propositions, or statements are true or false.  Individual words are 
typically not, though they may be correctly or incorrectly applied.  (But 
compare: Wittgenstein's remark on exclamations and ellipses PI 19 and 20.)

I'll try to comment on the remarks about "bearer-calls" and 
"bearer-assignments" later this weekend.

JPDeMouy

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