Messages In This Digest (9
Messages)
Messages
- 1.1.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 11:04 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@.. .> wrote:
> My view is that consciousness can be accounted for by describing
increasingly complex and sophisticated functionalities
What's a functionality? Speaking, thinking, walking, ...what people do
and say. Right? And developmentally psychology present a vast literature
of studies that show the increasing complexity. And in that description,
one takes for granted that the person under study is conscious. Since
consciousness is an assumption, it's origin is not studied. Unless you
are referring to the brain areas associated with consciousness. But then
again, this is a cor-relational study in which one assumes that the
person is conscious and measures brain activity. Of course, in doing so,
the brain is considered a necessary condition for C, but this research
never asks HOW the brain causes (produces) C. That the brain becomes
increasingly complex does not address the HOW. Moreover, if we build an
entity that we considered consciousness, it will not, in itself, tell us
HOW the material we put in became conscious. It just does.
> ...But if intentionality is describable
No "buts" about it. We can describe intentionality. My question for you
is this. If we describe intentionality in purposive terms, "I wrote this
post because I enjoy conversing with you", then how do you reconcile
this purposive account with a causal, non-purposive account of the
brain?
bruce
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.2.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 5:20 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@. ..> wrote:
<snip>
>
> What's a functionality? Speaking, thinking, walking, ...what people do
> and say. Right?
Yes, I use the term to denote the capacity to do a range of similar type things, accomplish a related range of tasks. If walking is a function, it may also be a functionality if it could be accomplished in more than one ways. However, getting from here to there, might be a larger functionality, including something like walking by leg movement and walking by rolling on wheels, etc.
> And developmentally psychology present a vast literature
> of studies that show the increasing complexity. And in that description,
> one takes for granted that the person under study is conscious. Since
> consciousness is an assumption, it's origin is not studied.
Right. It's a different field, that's all.
>Unless you
> are referring to the brain areas associated with consciousness. But then
> again, this is a cor-relational study in which one assumes that the
> person is conscious and measures brain activity.
Or wonders if the person is and hopes to make a determination by measuring the right kind of brain activity. This sort of thing doesn't purport to enter into the person's subjectivity though nor do I suggest otherwise (however I would note Dehaene's suggestion that if his thesis is right, it would be at least possible in principle to
achieve that kind of access -- I think Ramachandran says the same thing, by the way).
> Of course, in doing so,
> the brain is considered a necessary condition for C,
In humans so is air and sufficient nutrients and water. But the brain plays a different role than any of these so it is not merely a necessary condition.
>but this research
> never asks HOW the brain causes (produces) C.
It does if you're doing the kind of work Dehaene is though. That there are different kinds of research doesn't imply that either kind is nonexistent or even mistaken!
>That the brain becomes
> increasingly complex does not address the HOW.
It certainly may. If one is going about this by examining the brain morphology, then increasing complexity in brains under scrutiny would be a relevant concern.
> Moreover, if we build an
> entity that we considered consciousness, it will not, in itself, tell us
> HOW the material we put in became conscious.
Of course not. So what?
>It just does.
>
> > ...But if intentionality is describable
>
> No "buts" about it. We can describe intentionality.
Well there is the describability of saying what it feels like to be intentional (which may or may not be something we can really say), the describability of saying what we mean when we use the term in discourse and inquiry, and the description of the processes involved in brains, at varying levels, that manifest as intentional behavior and experience in subjects.
So "describability" will certainly vary depending on context and our objectives.
> My question for you
> is this. If we describe intentionality in purposive terms, "I wrote this
> post because I enjoy conversing with you", then how do you reconcile
> this purposive account with a causal, non-purposive account of the
> brain?
>
First, the usual way I am using "intentional" here refers to the aboutness meaning, not the purposive one. However, that is still not an issue in your question if we assume we both mean purposiveness here. Why would I need to talk about what your brain is doing? (This is one of the reason I don't agree with Sean's reduction of meaning as use or family resemblances to a matter of "brain scripts" -- though it's at least conceivable that science will ultimately explain these Wittgenstein- noted phenomena as something like what Sean seems to have in mind.)
Now I suppose what you really mean above though is how do I reconcile the idea that you act with purposes (you have motivations, make choices from various options, etc.) with the idea that brains produce minds (and all they entail) in some physically based causal way. And the answer to that is that I don't have to reconcile these because they involve different contexts of discussion for me. I have no problem supposing we have free will (in the every day sense we mean that term) and yet are physically generated, physically caused in every aspect of what we are. The physical universe is much more massive and complex than any idea of determinism- quashing- free-will can accommodate.
SWM
> bruce
>
>
> ============ ========= ========= ========= ==
> Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
>
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 2.1.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 11:38 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@.. .> wrote:
> Dennett argues that we can account for all the features we typically
associate with consciousness in ourselves
> by thinking of them in a different way, changing the paradigm.
The paradigm shift is what? A materialistic, causal account of C is as
old as the hills. The new neurology still doesn't tell us HOW brain
makes C. But there is something new here, you suggest.
> You want to say I or he have left out the transformation of a physical
phenomenon to a mental one. Fair enough.
Thanks for the recognition. But then you go on to sayy...
> But then you miss the point because we haven't left it out if one
accepts the paradigm shift.
Which is what? To deny that there we are conscious in the sense that we
have always seen ourselves. Yes, if we do that there is no B/M problem,
because there is no Mind. We've been kidding ourselves? Hmm...you
comment about D's work may help.
> Note that he says of his research at one point that "it turns out
Dennett was right".
In other words, both D's think that they have dispensed with mind by
describing everything we used to call "mental" in a material language.
Right? We use to think of feeling pain but now we say my C-fiber is
firing. We use to say "He is love" but now we say "his endorphins are
secreting. This sounds like silly word games to me. So, I misunderstand.
> His research is aimed at discovering what it is that brains do that
yield/produce/ constitute/ cause consciousness.
Hold on, didn't you say above that he doesn't show how brains actually
do that. One doesn't show how a C-fiber yield/produce/ constitute/ cause
pain by demonstrating the correlation. You've agreed time and again that
a complete description of C-fiber activity yields nothing about the pain
experience. So there is no possibility of discover. You know my
position. We can't discover how a C-fiber causes pain because the
relationship between the fiber and the experience is not causal in any
sense, but conceptual in view of the researcher.
> I have described consciousness as being an agglomeration of certain
features we recognize in ourselves,
> specifically in our subjective experience.
Surely there is no paradigm shift here, especially in the phrase
"subjective experience."
> By "we associate with" I meant (and have always meant) the things we
think of when speaking of consciousness!
Old fashion "mentalism". No? Perhaps you think me cranky, but if the
paradigm shift is away from talking about mind and consciousness as
something other than brains on fire, then you can't go back to
describing your consciousness.
> Think again of the wheel and its turning. If the wheel is an entity,
must we think its turning is, too??????
I can't see why this analogy has a hold on you. Yes, the turning is an
entity but turning is what entities do, from point A to point B. We can
"see" the turn in that we see the displacement of the wheel. But we
can't see the brain do consciousness because we don't see consciousness.
There is no analogy here beyond the fact that both C and turning aren't
entities, although turning is what an entity can do.
Another analogy,
> Here's the coin picture again: The brain's processes, its operations,
are the coin.
which we can see.
> The experiences occurring to the subject, the subjectness, are the
other (side).
It is intriguing to say that. What are we saying?
> Two sides, one coin, but each side is also itself and not the other.
Yes. And one side of a coin is a condition for there being another side
but not a causal condition. Logical? Well, in the sense that what we
mean by a coin is that it has two sides. We can also imply that,
basically, the two are the "same thing", since head and tails are
arbitrary.
In some ways this works for the brain/mind correlation. What's called
identity theory. I'm at home with that except for one nagging question.
If we describe the brain side causally, how do we justify describing the
mind side intentionally?
This returns us to the B/M problem as it always was. I see no paradigm
shift in any of this.
bruce
Not logical identity, something else, albeit something perfectly
ordinary and comprehensible if one can shake the fixation on identity as
a claim of logic.
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 2.2.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 1:31 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@. ..> wrote:
>
> > Think again of the wheel and its turning. If the wheel is an
> > entity must we think its turning is, too??????
>
> I can't see why this analogy has a hold on you. Yes, the turning
> is an entity but turning is what entities do, from point A to
> point B. We can "see" the turn in that we see the displacement of
> the wheel. But we can't see the brain do consciousness because we
> don't see consciousness. There is no analogy here beyond the fact
> that both C and turning aren't entities, although turning is what
> an entity can do.
I don't think the analogy is total, but it might be clarifying on a
couple of useful points.
(and you said above both that turning is an entity, and that it
isn't)
Let's step back a moment.
The wheel is a material object.
It may not be turning.
Something (kinetic energy) must be added to make it turn.
(details depending on whether the wheel is hanging on a post, or attached to a wagon, etc)
I don't see how that makes turning an "entity", but then, we could
quibble about what "entity" means anyway.
A turning wheel may generally have more interesting causal effects
than a non-turning wheel. I would not guess this is "consciousness" ,
but it may be "motion"!
I would say there is a wheel without turning, but I'd say there is
not a turning, without the wheel.
What is it like, to be a turning wheel?
ObW: We are talking about the facts of the matter here mixed in
with how we use particular terms, of which the most problematic
seems to be "entity". Is it possible to clarify "entity", without
serious regard for the underlying facts?
Josh
ps - apologies for as much of this as Stuart may have already recited
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 2.3.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 5:36 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@. ..> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > Dennett argues that we can account for all the features we typically
> associate with consciousness in ourselves
> > by thinking of them in a different way, changing the paradigm.
>
> The paradigm shift is what? A materialistic, causal account of C is as
> old as the hills. The new neurology still doesn't tell us HOW brain
> makes C. But there is something new here, you suggest.
>
We stop looking for mind as entity (or pseudo entity) and think of it instead as process. Once we give up the idea of consciousness as being a unified entity-like phenomenon, it is more easily explainable as a complex set of brain functionalities, accomplished by a process-based system running in brains.
> > You want to say I or he have left out the transformation of a physical
> phenomenon to a mental one. Fair enough.
>
> Thanks for the recognition. But then you go on to sayy...
>
> > But then you miss the point because we haven't left it out if one
> accepts the paradigm shift.
>
> Which is what?
See above.
>To deny that there we are conscious in the sense that we
> have always seen ourselves.
No, to do that is to miss the point of the paradigm shift. We are still just what we are. We still have the experience of being selves, of having a mental life, of being aware, etc. It's just that now we can see how this can be accounted for in terms of physical processes going on in brains.
> Yes, if we do that there is no B/M problem,
> because there is no Mind. We've been kidding ourselves? Hmm...you
> comment about D's work may help.
>
Again you miss the point. To accept the Dennett paradigm adjustment we don't have to say we have no minds, only that mind isn't what we are initially prompted to take it as based on introspection alone.
> > Note that he says of his research at one point that "it turns out
> Dennett was right".
>
This was a reference to what Dehaene says about his work in relation to Dennett's thesis.
> In other words, both D's think that they have dispensed with mind by
> describing everything we used to call "mental" in a material language.
> Right?
No, wrong. See above.
>We use to think of feeling pain but now we say my C-fiber is
> firing. We use to say "He is love" but now we say "his endorphins are
> secreting. This sounds like silly word games to me. So, I misunderstand.
>
Again, you miss the whole point of the paradigm shift which is NOT to deny mind but to explain it in terms of what we can discover scientifically about brains.
> > His research is aimed at discovering what it is that brains do that
> yield/produce/ constitute/ cause consciousness.
>
> Hold on, didn't you say above that he doesn't show how brains actually
> do that. One doesn't show how a C-fiber yield/produce/ constitute/ cause
> pain by demonstrating the correlation. You've agreed time and again that
> a complete description of C-fiber activity yields nothing about the pain
> experience. So there is no possibility of discover.
Nope, I've never agreed there is no possibility to discover! I've agreed that we don't look for or expect access to others' subjectivity but Dehaene does appear to believe that such access is at least in principle possible. So does Ramachandran.
> You know my
> position. We can't discover how a C-fiber causes pain because the
> relationship between the fiber and the experience is not causal in any
> sense, but conceptual in view of the researcher.
>
I think that's just playing with words.
> > I have described consciousness as being an agglomeration of certain
> features we recognize in ourselves,
> > specifically in our subjective experience.
>
> Surely there is no paradigm shift here, especially in the phrase
> "subjective experience."
>
The idea is not to deny "subjective experience" but to explain it in a way that makes it conceivable as an outcome of physical processes.
> > By "we associate with" I meant (and have always meant) the things we
> think of when speaking of consciousness!
>
> Old fashion "mentalism". No? Perhaps you think me cranky, but if the
> paradigm shift is away from talking about mind and consciousness as
> something other than brains on fire, then you can't go back to
> describing your consciousness.
Again, you don't grasp the paradigm shift. You keep hanging onto this idea that to accept the Dennettian model is to deny minds. But that isn't the point of it at all. As to your reference to "old fashioned mentalism" -- no!
>
> > Think again of the wheel and its turning. If the wheel is an entity,
> must we think its turning is, too??????
>
> I can't see why this analogy has a hold on you. Yes, the turning is an
> entity
I assume you mean't "isn't"?
> but turning is what entities do, from point A to point B. We can
> "see" the turn in that we see the displacement of the wheel. But we
> can't see the brain do consciousness because we don't see consciousness.
Sure we do. We see it in our subjective experience and we see it in the way others behave. It's just a different kind of turning!
> There is no analogy here beyond the fact that both C and turning aren't
> entities, although turning is what an entity can do.
>
See above.
> Another analogy,
>
> > Here's the coin picture again: The brain's processes, its operations,
> are the coin.
>
> which we can see.
>
> > The experiences occurring to the subject, the subjectness, are the
> other (side).
>
> It is intriguing to say that. What are we saying?
>
> > Two sides, one coin, but each side is also itself and not the other.
>
> Yes. And one side of a coin is a condition for there being another side
> but not a causal condition. Logical?
This has to do with how we express the idea. As Sean correctly says elsewhere in another context, you can't fit this into a logical form because the meanings must be attended to and the meanings alter in the syllogism. Is the head the condition of my quarter's tail? Think about how that sounds. Is that what we mean by a "condition"? It really works much more poorly than the notion of causality in the sense of wetness and the water molecules. But identity is fine, too, as long as you steer clear of the idea that now were invoking logical identity -- which I expect you won't because you need a hook to hang your objection on!
> Well, in the sense that what we
> mean by a coin is that it has two sides. We can also imply that,
> basically, the two are the "same thing", since head and tails are
> arbitrary.
>
> In some ways this works for the brain/mind correlation. What's called
> identity theory. I'm at home with that except for one nagging question.
> If we describe the brain side causally, how do we justify describing the
> mind side intentionally?
>
Different domains of reference.
> This returns us to the B/M problem as it always was. I see no paradigm
> shift in any of this.
>
> bruce
That's because you have missed the paradigm shift above and simply continue to do so at this point in your response.
SWM
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 3a.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 2:54 pm (PST)
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Sean Wilson < whoooo26505@yahoo.com> wrote:
> From: Sean Wilson < whoooo26505@yahoo.com>
> Subject: [C] [Wittrs] On Languge Being "Open Ended"
> To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
> Date: Thursday, February 11, 2010, 6:10 PM
> ... reply to this (and a private
> message of Stuart's): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/4288
>
> One of the things I have found about people who cannot
> become black-belt Wittgensteinians is that their language
> skills are poor.
Sean, your abominable understanding of later Wittgenstein would be tolerable if you weren't so insufferably arrogant. If there was anything likable about you, I would cringe with empathetic embarrassment everytime you post something. But, alas, you appear to have virtually no redeeming qualities as a human being. We all have our foibles, but you appear to have little else. What is really telling, concerning your ignorance of all things Wittgensteinian, is that you can't tell when Wittgenstein is taking a position in preparation for its demolition! I pointed out a specific instance to you, and even Stern mustered sufficient nut to agree with me - If I remember correctly, he even quoted from PI the material succedent to your quote which showed incontrovertibly that Wittgenstein was attacking the position that you claimed was his (Wittgenstein' s) position. Now, you have a similar situation in which I have attacked your inane interpretation of "family
resemblence" and "language games." In case you have not noticed, JPD leveled exactly the same criticisms against your views as did I, though I am guessing I will get no support from JPD, probably because he finds my rhetorical tactics boorish, and he simply does not like me. So be it. I can live with that. But clearly, much of his latest, undeniably-harsh, viciously-sarcastic reply to you was peppered with statements that revealed that he had read the post to which I am replying. Anyway...on to the rest of your insipid post...
>And it isn't language skills in the sense
> of being a good grammarian or English professor -- though
> some of that may be connected -- its poor "radar" for what
> language is doing. And hence you get the following:
> (a) a bumper-sticker approach to the issue ("the
> anything-goes approach to language");
Even Stuart, clearly no fan of mine, was compelled to defend me with respect to this issue, and his post echoed the same points made by me and JPD with respect to your "anything goes" interpretation of word usage.
>(b) terrible
> counter-examples ("come over to my can of peas, and we'll
> lick it over a cup of puke" -- which, of course, still could
> make sense under given circumstances [can of peas = hobbit
> house; puke= a putrid drink]);(... )
Good God, Sean, of course the example I gave "makes sense"; I simply substituted "can of peas" for "house," "lick" for "discuss," and "puke" for "coffee" (tea if you live on the other side of the pond). The example is simplistic, befitting your limited (and that is being charitable) philosophical skills, but it makes the same point that JPD did when he challenged you to defend, in court, someone who was married, and cheating, who claimed they were, by some definition, "a bachelor." It is clear, to anyone but the sycophants that largely populate this list, that JPD has delivered to you a serious spanking. Now, you may say, if you had any inkling of the understanding of fallacies, that I offer naught but an argumentum ad populum, but it is you who has made this into a political game.
(c) a failure to understand
> Wittgenstein; and, relatedly, (d) the failure to
> appreciate how structure exists in the absence of
> rules, definitions or determinacy. Also, there seems to be
> this concomitant psycholo gical need to see words as things
> that bind people in certain ways, or else, "the world
> shakes," so to speak.
Most of the above strikes me as gibberish. But I think it is clear that I, and others, are arguing that it is you who fails to "understand Wittgenstein.
>
> Hopefully, when I complete the manuscript I am working
> on, you can both find help with these matters. (Be done in
> about 2 months). For now, some basics:
>
> 1. It is Russellian to say that words mean what
> dictionaries say or what is "commonly said. " It is no
> coincidence that this view is linked with the view that
> logic dictates what is said, and that what cannot pass this
> test is not meaningful. This school of thought was
> overthrown by Wittgenstein. (Hallelujah) .
This is somehow a characterization of what I have said? Where have I said this?
>
> 2. Meaning is use means exactly that. There are no statist
> or political criteria.
Good Lord, Sean, that is not what "meaning is use" (MIU) is meant to convey. The message is that there is no thing, in the alleged mind, or the widely-misunderstoo d brain, that is the hidden, occult cause of meaningful utterances. There is nothing that is hidden (in the alleged mind or the real, but misunderstood, brain) behind utterances. Utterances, as behavioral phenomena, are to be taken at face value; they are not "symptoms" of some mental (or neurological) entity! And Wittgenstein is ever-so-clear on this when, early in PI, after talking about "slabs" and "blocks" etc., he asks how is it that these commands are effective; the answer he gives is "training." Do you deny this? Unfortunately, not even Wittgenstein, himself, saw the implications of this statement for science: What is the relation between a person's history ("training") and what they say in certain circumstances? This, of course, is a question that a science of behavior addresses. In
its rudimentary form, it asks the question, "If an animal is exposed to an enviroment that has particular characteristics, what does the animal come to do?"
>Majorities do not determine what
> people say. Only brains and their behavior do.
What utter garbage! Of course, "majorities" determine what people say. I speak English because I was raised by English speakers, in a town where almost everybody spoke English. I call a chair "chair" because of my exposure to this community. Do you think that Wittgenstein would have a problem with this, oh Arrogant One? And the implication that "behavior determines what people say" (i.e, Majorities do not determine what
people say. Only brains and their behavior do)? Speech (and signing among the deaf etc,) IS behavior. How could it be that behavior determines behavior? What could that even mean?
>What this
> means is that language is as language does. And that if X
> and Y "score goals" with whatever usages they do, there is
> no authority structure that can be appealed to that could
> invalidate the goals. (Cardinal Principle #1: meaning is
> use).
Au contraire, Herr Dimwit, "goals" can only be "scored" if the cultural histories are shared among the participants, and these "cultural histories" consist of a community that tells one things like, "No, that is not a 'dog,' it is a 'cow.'" This is painfully obvious. That you have missed it is indicative of your adherence to some bizarre philosophical view of the nature of "authority." Those that have caused me to "speak English" are not, in any sense, an official "authority"; they do not dwell in an office with a sign that designates them as such, but they are, nonetheless, a potent authority. No? Anyway, even though your post goes on below, I have expended enough effort with respect to your endless, insipid tripe, and I close, temporarily, here.
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 3b.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 4:31 pm (PST)
GS,
"In case you have not noticed, JPD leveled exactly the same criticisms against your views as did I, though I am guessing I will get no support from JPD, probably because he finds my rhetorical tactics boorish, and he simply does not like me. So be it. I can live with that."
Nah. Nothing personal. I just don't want to get drawn into cross-talk. I haven't been here long and I've already come to regret that. Here I'll just comment on remarks mentioning me, in case I need to clarify.
"But clearly, much of his latest, undeniably-harsh, viciously-sarcastic reply to you..."
I hope I wasn't all that bad! I was aiming for just enough sarcasm to make my displeasure with certain things known and to convey my point. Apparently, I went overboard!
"...but it makes the same point that JPD did..."
Actually, closer to your point was when I credited him with "a clever seduction" and told him that "I depreciated it." And the point of these were that even when someone still manages to get a point across, they may yet be undeniably incorrect. But irregardless, I could care less. (I hope those are also recognized as examples.)
"...when he challenged you to defend, in court, someone who was married, and cheating, who claimed they were, by some definition, 'a bachelor.'"
Just to be clear, the issue would be perjury (or subornation, ethical violations, and malpractice is his attorney had advised it). Sean seems (I hope) to agree that someone who he might call a bachelor in some "extended sense" would still be married and would still be cheating. But my point was that just by using such misleading language (whether or not one had cheated!) could get one into quite a bit of trouble. With the law as well as one's spouse. And caviling about "family resemblances" would be to no avail.
"It is clear, to anyone but the sycophants that largely populate this list, that JPD has delivered to you a serious spanking."
Again, I hope just enough to get his attention. No gratuitous displays of force.
Not sure who the "sycophants" are. No matter. Never mind. (As Hume didn't say.)
JPDeMouy
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 4.1.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 4:58 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@ ...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
<snip>
>
> > You are arguing that efforts like these are foredoomed because
> > algorithmically driven processes lack the capacity to adapt.
>
> To be clear, I am not really arguing.
I was using "argue" in the rhetorical sense, in the sense in which any controversial claim made in the course of a dispute has an argumentative role. I certainly didn't mean to suggest you were making any kind of formal argument or that you were aiming to persuade!
>I am comparing my approach with
> that of AI, because a comparison helps to illustrate important points.
>
> To argue is to attempt to persuade, and I am not trying to persuade
> you. I'm just explaining my ideas as best I can.
>
>
> > If living systems are algorithmic at a genomic level too then even
> > their adaptational capacity is causally grounded.
>
> I do not consider them to be algorithmic at the genomic level.
>
Then we have a disagreement on what "algorithmic" means which I suppose isn't surprising. Note that I mean it in the generic sense, in which computer programs in programming or machine language are just one sort of algorithm. Another kind would be a step-by-step procedure written down for someone to follow in accomplishing some task. Still another, on this view, is the set of "blueprints" which a living organism follows as it develops the system that it is. On such a view the coding in our genomes and the coding in a computer's inputted code are not different in terms of the role they play even if they are carried in different material, consist of different kinds of steps, etc.
>
> > So what is the feature that produces what we recognize as
> > consciousness?
>
> I guess that depends on what is meant by "consciousness. "
>
> Regards,
> Neil
In the end, that's what this is all about. What is consciousness, what should we think of when we use the term, what do we actually think of and how does what we think of accord with the way things really are?
Anyway, you initially said that the missing piece, the reason AI can't conceivably succeed in producing conscious intelligence, was that it lacked homeostasis. I have been interested in THAT thesis for some time. As far as I can see, it seems to boil down to a claim that there is something about biological entities that non-biological entities just cannot have, i.e., homeostasis. What I have been hoping is that you would identify whatever the specific thing is which homeostasis leads to/makes possible/produces, etc., which finally gives us instances of consciousness.
You've suggested a number of things in the course of our exchanges, the most recent being adaptiveness or adaptation, but you've recently said that none of the suggested intermediate steps (pragmatics, perception, adapatation) form a direct 'line' from homeostasis to consciousness. I am still willing to consider that homeostasis brings something to the table that computers don't have but as of now I don't believe you've taken a stand that any of these are the "missing link". Is there something else that is then? In other words, what is the mechanism by which homeostasis becomes/produces consciousness?
For the record, and just to reiterate, what I mean by "consciousness" is that array of features we discover in our own subjective experience (our mental life) that we associate with being conscious, having a mind. Included among these are:
awareness
understanding
remembering
thinking
feeling
perceiving
intentionality (aboutness)
intentionality (having purposes)
I don't suggest that this list is necessarily exhaustive or that we might not be able to say that some of these are really different aspects of others of these (or maybe that all are really aspects of one thing). I just want to note that when we think of consciousness, of having minds, these are the features we usually associate with what it means to be conscious, to have a mind. In ourselves we can discover these features by a little introspection (paying attention to what's going on when we think about things). In others, we typically recognize these features by the behaviors manifested (including self reports).
If you mean something different by "consciousness" I'd be interested to consider it. But if the issue preventing you from suggesting what the critical mechanism between homeostasis and consciousness is remains some uncertainty about what is meant by "consciousness" , this, at least, is what I mean.
Thanks.
SWM
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 4.2.
-
Sat Feb 13, 2010 7:47 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@.. .> wrote:
> Anyway, you initially said that the missing piece, the reason AI
> can't conceivably succeed in producing conscious intelligence,
> was that it lacked homeostasis.
I don't think I actually said that. What I did say, was that I ran
into stumbling blocks when investigating how AI could solve the
problems, and homeostasis turned out to be able to get past those
stumbling blocks. While I am skeptical that AI (as computationalism)
can succeed, I don't have any proof that it cannot.
> You've suggested a number of things in the course of our exchanges,
> the most recent being adaptiveness or adaptation, but you've recently
> said that none of the suggested intermediate steps (pragmatics,
> perception, adapatation) form a direct 'line' from homeostasis
> to consciousness.
I am looking at things, looking at the problems that a cognitive agent
must solve, in a very different way from that assumed by most AI
people. It has been hard to explain the differences and the reasons
for them, because we start talking past one another at that point.
> For the record, and just to reiterate, what I mean by "consciousness"
> is that array of features we discover in our own subjective
> experience (our mental life) that we associate with being conscious,
> having a mind. Included among these are:
> awareness
> understanding
> remembering
> thinking
> feeling
> perceiving
> intentionality (aboutness)
> intentionality (having purposes)
My approach seems to cover those. I am writing up something at the
moment, and I'll email you about it when I have filled in enough of the
details.
Regards,
Neil
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
![]()
|
