--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote: > If thinking requires brain activity, and brain activity can be > simulated on a computer, then why isn't "thinking like computation?" Some thinking can be like computation, except that computation as done on a computer seems to be mechanical. My view gives perception a central role. If thinking is behavior, then our perception of self includes a perception of that (possibly suppressed) behavior. And perception is evaluative. That evaluative aspect is missing with computation. When logic is done on a computer, it is mechanical. We rely on mechanical contraints to force the logic in a computer to take the correct route (i.e. follow the rules of inference). When we do logic, what we do is not mechanical, but we instead use the evaluative aspect of thinking. As we proceed with the logic, we are evaluating the steps we take, checking on whether we are properly following the rules of inference. But the evaluative component of our doing logic is broader than what is provided by the mechanical constraints of the computer. In particular, it is not purely syntactical. We evaluate the syntactic actions to check that we follow the rules of inference. But we also evaluate the semantic aspects, and that's why we are less likely than the computer to fall into the "garbage in, garbage out" problem. > I don't mean to be difficult but now it seems as if we have two > agents. One, the neural system, managing behavior and the other, > the person, thinking. Hmm, no. The neural system is not an agent. The person is an agent, and the neural system is involved in providing the agency (by doing the grunt work). Regards, Neil WEB VIEW: http://tinyurl.com/ku7ga4 TODAY: http://alturl.com/whcf 3 DAYS: http://alturl.com/d9vz 1 WEEK: http://alturl.com/yeza GOOGLE: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs YAHOO: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/ FREELIST: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009