[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2009 03:09:39 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "blroadies" <blroadies@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > Who's talking about studying indvidual brain cells alone? Neither
> Edelman nor Hawkins are doing that.
>
> I agree. They are studying brain areas and are defining the area from
> "mind to brain." For example: We find the brain area for pain by
> pinching the skin surface and seeing what part of the brain "lights up."
> But we call it the brain area because the subject reports hurting.
> This is how they work. Show me where they say "the brain part caused
> pain."
>
I told you I am not going to re-transcribe material here from what they wrote.
I have already done that so you might as well go back and take a look.
Perhaps, though, I'll type in some more Hawkins tomorrow. I was just re-reading
his chapter 6 about how the cortex works. It's interesting enough to transcribe
here I think, if I've the energy for it. I will say this though. At least one
of the weaknesses in both Hawkins and Edelman is that while they both describe
brain functions to varying degrees as a means of explaining the phenomena of
mind neither gives a really clear picture of the issue that seems to have you
in a dither: how physical effects on physical things becomes the experience of
those effects. I think Dennett does a better job of that in Consciousness
Explained.
> It is the sharp that caused pain. True, if the brain part wasn't
> activated, then the person wouldn't feel pain. He needs the brain part.
> Just as I need my fingers to play the piano. When I do, there are brain
> events which are identical with playing the piano. They are not causing
> piano playing, there an aspect of piano playing.
Bruce, there are multiple uses of "cause". I am not going to keep arguing this
ad infinitum. Assume, therefore, that I have reiterated the case for this yet
again.
> Closer to you two sides
> of the coin, which stand in no causal relation.
>
See immediately above. For someone who admires Wittgenstein it strikes me that
you have an oddly rigid and literal concept of how we use words.
> > we can conceive of consciousness as a process-based system
>
> And we can do so without any reference to brain.
Well, of course. But the point is that we know at least that brains bring minds
about and, so far, we have no knowledge that any other physical platform has
done so despite the theoretical arguments about this.
> The trick is relating
> the brain process to the mental process. Chalmers sees it as impossible,
> given the conceptual tools at our disposal.
>
And, more importantly, given what he takes mind to be, i.e., outside the
physical realm of being and, therefore, explanation.
> Where we seem to differ. I see our concepts as tools, not a reflection
> of how the world "really is."
And that means what exactly? What do you think you are imputing to me here? Is
the world a great mystery? Well it is in one sense. But science has certainly
shown the capacity to erase much of the mystery though it has no traction in
the metaphysical sphere of course where mystery remains. But so what? We aren't
speaking of metaphysics here but of brains and minds, both of which are
demonstrably part of the empirical world.
> We conceive brain along one line, and
> minds along another.
That's not entirely true. There are certainly different language games but when
we are playing the empirical descriptive game of science then brains and minds
are both fit subjects of discussion because both are identifiably part of the
physical world, the target of empirical inquiry.
> Perhaps someone will come along and provide a
> unitary model. In the mean time, it is senseless to insist that, whether
> we like it or not, you are in a position to know, that...
>
I never said I am in a position to know. I have argued for a conception of mind
here and on other lists where we have debated this. But I have said repeatedly
that ultimately it's an empirical question. Any conception we come up with must
accord with the facts observed in the world. It remains to be seen if Dennett's
conception can be shown to do that though I think it's the best candidate I've
seen so far. On the other hand, there is a vast abundance of evidence already
in that brains have a causal relation with minds. To say otherwise one either
has to argue for a whole different way of thinking about the universe (that
it's dualist rather than unitary) which may or may not be true but which, as of
now, there is no evidence for AND which requires we violate Occam's Razor by
coming up with a more complicated description of things than seems necessary.
Or one has to argue for unintelligibility as you often do but which is an
arbitrary claim here since you have given no serious grounds for telling us
that what looks perfectly sensible on the evidence cannot be because of some
conceptual confusion. Cayuse's argument for unintelligibility is even worse
since it requires us to posit things which, by his own definition, cannot even
be conceived of because there is no referent associated with them and no
grammar!
I can see there is little chance of ever dissuading either of you from your
commitments here. But the evidence on offer is pretty strong that you are both
mainly arguing for a preferred position rather than for a position that has
facts behind it.
> > Brains still cause minds, any way you cut this...
>
> but say "how" by talking about complex computers which miraculously
> spout minds.
>
??? (I've already discussed at great length Dennett's model which, as you know,
I think is quite convincing. Are you asking me to reiterate thousands of words
from past debates here? Better to just go and read Dennett for yourself.)
> > Minds are real phenomena in the universe.
>
> meaning that we have a concept of mind, not that there is an object out
> there that is mind. Right?
>
Right, not an object as in something physical. but wrong because minds ARE
objects of reference in the broader sense of "object", again something we have
discussed extensively in the past.
> > Minds appear to be existentially dependent on brains and what they do.
>
> Our concept of mind is inextricably tied to our concept of brain.
My dear Bruce, I hope you aren't arguing that if no one had a concept of a mind
and a brain there would be neither!
> Tied
> conceptually, not materially. The brain doesn't connect to the mind the
> way the shin bone connects to the thigh bone.
>
Kill the brain and all the evidence suggests you kill the mind. There is no
evidence (though some doctrinaire beliefs) that this doesn't happen. This is
not a conceptual linkage because without anyone to conceive of it, all the
evidence available tells us things would still happen this way. You are hanging
your hat on the wrong hook here if you mean to save minds from brains!
> > are minds ontologically separate and co-existent with brains?
>
> There you go with you question of substance. One or many. I'll leave it
> you. Doubt that your research friends would be concerned.
>
The problem is that your argument presumes mind is not connected to anything
physical (see your attempt above to argue for a "conceptual" connection only).
Thus YOU are arguing for a dualist position while refusing to acknowledge the
obvious implications of what you say because you think dualism is somehow
disreputable. You hide, instead, behind a faux Wittgensteinian argument of
"unintelligibility" and prolong the debate by simply refusing to process any of
the points I have made in response to your past comments. No matter how many
times I explain my position about "two sides of a coin" identity or "causality"
in the sense explicated by Searle or dualism, you just come back with the same
responses, as though I had never said any of what I have said. That is hardly a
ticket for progress in our discussion and it will eventually tire out any list
readers following along, as it tired out past readers on past lists.
Must we really reprise all that has gone before in endless loops?
> > Are minds the real cause of everything physical including brains,
> etc.?
>
> Given your liberal use of "cause", why not? If we didn't have a mind,
> nothing would exist because "existence" is a concept.
You're verging on idealism here but I'm sure you'd want to disavow that as much
as you disavow being a dualist. But is disavowal enough when one's own words
testify to the contrary?
> Of course, you
> hold that the ontological question, what exists, can be answered apart
> from the epistemological one, "how do we know."
I'm not arguing ontological questions. I am making the point that to think
consciousness is inexplicable in physical terms is to commit to a certain
ontological position that requires explication and defense and which flies in
the face of the evidence of our everyday lives. Why do that when we can
describe consciousness within the confines of ordinary default ontological
positions which don't demand to be argued for?
> That allows some folks
> to say "mind comes first", and others say "matter." And since, in every
> instance, we have both, this chicken and egg game can go on forever.
>
The way to end the "forever" aspect is to deal with the points being made in
the discussion rather than simply ignoring them. Either argue against them or
recognize their potency (if they cannot be argued away). Pretending they were
never said is what causes us (not in the Searlean sense I used earlier for
"causes") to go round and round interminably.
> But wait. The zygote has no mind. It is only material. Mind comes
> latter. So the material makes the mind. Or, the zygote has a primitive
> mind and it emerges latter.
What would THAT be? Is it of a piece with Strawson's panpsychism then?
> How does one decide and what difference
> would it make to developmental theory.
>
> bruce
There's no evidence of a mind in a zygote, anymore than there is in atoms or in
electrons, so why impute one to any of these? What kind of argument can you
make for it? If it's only a speculative metaphysical one, why bother since it
isn't provable and requires a complete redescription of the universe with added
complexity for which no basis can be adduced. Indeed, why stop there? Why not
just go on to tri-ism or quadism and leave puny dualism behind?
SWM
Group Home Page: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
Group Discussion Board: http://seanwilson.org/forum/
Google Archive: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs
FreeList Archive: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs
FreeList for September: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009
FreeList for August: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/08-2009
Group Creator's Page: http://seanwilson.org/
Today's Messages: http://alturl.com/whcf
Messages From Last 3 Days: http://alturl.com/d9vz
This Week's Messages: http://alturl.com/yeza
Yahoo Archive: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/
Other related posts:
