[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2009 17:11:14 +0100
swmaerske wrote:
"Cayuse" wrote:
Fine, though it's a little disappointing that this discussion ends
just at the point where a step forward had taken place (namely your
claim that your use of the word 'consciousness' can be entirely divorced
from Nagel's).
It's not a new claim, Cayuse though I haven't made it in precisely
the way you pose it here. First I am not asserting anything about
Nagel's view, only yours -- as you have expressed it here. Second I
am not saying "entirely divorced". That is your reading. I am saying
that what I am talking about has relevance for science even if it
sounds to you as if it is what you are talking about.
What has relevance for science are those aspects attaching to the word
'consciousness' that have empirical content. Nagel identifies a use of that
word that has /no/ empirical content, and that consequently can have no
relevance for science. I'm wondering how contrived one has to be in
order to completely divorce one's use of that word entirely from Nagel's,
since if that /can't/ be done, there will always remain this residue that is
intractable to science and that therefore poses a particularly /hard/
problem for those hoping to see consciousness fit into an entirely
physicalist account.
More I'm saying that what you are talking about has no relevance for
discourse at all (no grammar, no referent, no language) and therefore
there's nothing to talk about in any discursive way, which is all we
can do here anyway. You certainly can adopt a religious or mystical
attitude toward consciousness as I think you are doing and deny the
relevance of science for that and I would agree. But then what's to
talk about here since THAT is not a matter of talking but rather
feeling and practicing.
On the other hand I don't recall Nagel's comments as being intended
to amplify a religious perspective at all.
I'm defending Chalmers' view that physicalism encounters a uniquely hard
problem of consciousness following his adoption of Nagel's use of the
word. Neither Nagel nor Chalmers are talking about a religious or a
spiritual perspective. I don't see any reason to employ those terms in this
debate and so I neither use them nor acknowledge their use by others.
"Cayuse" wrote:
The question is specious.
All you're doing is assuming your conclusion, i.e., that we can't
speak of what brings it (consciousness) about because it is too
"hard" to explain.
That "the question is specious" is an entirely different claim to the
claim that "it's hard to explain what brings consciousness about".
I probably shouldn't be doing this because I am rather tired of going
round and round and never getting anywhere but I'll take a shot
anyway. What is the basis of your claim that "the question is
specious" then (since you previously coupled it with a claim about
the Chalmersian "hardness" of the question???
We seek an explanation for what we can't fit into our world-view.
This mode of behavior confers a better understanding of our habitat,
and that in turn confers advantages in terms of survival and reproduction,
and so our propensity to seek explanation has become instinctive.
But explanation must end somewhere, and our instinct doesn't take that
into account.
But this claim of being a "hard question", aside from its
attractiveness to some who want this to be the case, is, in the
end, a dualist presumption which Chalmers admits to explicitly,
though you deny dualism on an apparently mystical/Buddhist reading
of Wittgenstein (i.e., that it is a nonsense question). Aside from
the fact that I think that is a wrong interpretation of
Wittgenstein (I have already explained why elsewhere in these
threads), note that it depends on Chalmers' dualist analysis of
consciousness which you say you deny.
"This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates
basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics.
But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with
the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach
contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add
further /bridging/ principles to explain how experience arises from
physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or
mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a
physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by
fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but
Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this
position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the
universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple
laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of
consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have
a name, a good choice might be /naturalistic dualism/."
http://consc.net/papers/facing.html
Chalmers is not arguing that the question is specious, and so ends up
entertaining the possibility of "further bridging principles to
explain how experience arises from physical processes".
Right, he is not. You are. But you invoke his dualism to make your claim.
As Chalmers says, it is an innocent dualism entirely compatible
with the scientific view of the world. There is nothing spiritual
or mystical about it. The dualism I reject is /substance/ dualism.
Group Home Page: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
Group Discussion Board: http://seanwilson.org/forum/
Google Archive: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs
FreeList Archive: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs
FreeList for September: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009
FreeList for August: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/08-2009
Group Creator's Page: http://seanwilson.org/
Today's Messages:
http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?S=d886f18704524b9992bac8164354cd96&SQ=0&t=mnav&rng=1&rng2=0&u=86400&forum_limiter=&btn_submit=Begin+Search
Messages From Last 3 Days:
http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?S=d886f18704524b9992bac8164354cd96&SQ=0&t=mnav&rng=3&rng2=0&u=86400&forum_limiter=&btn_submit=Begin+Search
This Week's Messages:
http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?S=d886f18704524b9992bac8164354cd96&SQ=0&t=mnav&rng=7&rng2=0&u=86400&forum_limiter=&btn_submit=Begin+Search
Yahoo Archive:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs;_ylc=X3oDMTJmMzg0Z3FnBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzI4NjkzODY5BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTYzMjIyNwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2Z2hwBHN0aW1lAzEyNTE4NDE4MDc-
Other related posts:
