--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote: > > swmaerske wrote: > > "Cayuse" wrote: > >> The point is to address any claim concerning the "scientific > >> investigation of consciousness". My claim is that any such > >> investigation can only address whatever empirical content > >> consciousness is stipulated to have, and that Nagel's use of > >> the term has no empirical content. Moreover, that I would be > >> interested in any argument that the two can be entirely divorced. > > > > If they can't be divorced, as you claim, then you ARE arguing that > > one cannot empirically study brains and the consciousness they > > produce. But of course they can be divorced and one doesn't need to > > make a logical argument to see this. All one needs to do is to note > > what we actually find in the world, namely brains and the many > > features of consciousness we call "mind" and the existential relation > > that obtains between them which appears to flow from brains to minds. > > We can empirically study brains, but since we cannot empirically study > "subjective experience", we cannot even justify the claim that "the brain > produces subjective experience". We can move forward on this when you > show how you can entirely divorce your use of the word 'consciousness' > from Nagel's "what it is like". That is the direction that is of particular > interest to me here, and, it seems to me, the crux of the issue. > I really don't think we are talking to each other any longer, just past, as they say. I have already given quite a bit of information about what I mean by "awareness" and "subjective experience". I think you are seriously mistaken if you don't see how these things can be studied empirically. They occur in the world, therefore they are phenomena in the world (in one perfectly standard use of "phenomena" as I've already noted). All we're doing now is going round and round. If you want to think that "subjective experience" is some metaphysically impenetrable notion, go for it. So far it seems to me that all your arguments for this founder on the rocks of this particular shore. But it's plain you're not prepared to accept that assessment. Well, I suppose it's not impossible you could even be right and I could be wrong. But I don't think so (obviously) and, worse, I see no chance we can ever find a way to communicate on this matter, given our differing predilections on the subject. Perhaps one of us will come to a different conclusion some day. Clearly though, it isn't about to happen on this list in the forseeable future. -- SWM Group Home Page: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html Group Discussion Board: http://seanwilson.org/forum/ Google Archive: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs FreeList Archive: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs FreeList for September: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009 FreeList for August: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/08-2009 Group Creator's Page: http://seanwilson.org/ Today's Messages: http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?SØ86f18704524b9992bac8164354cd96&SQ=0&t=mnav&rng=1&rng2=0&u?400&forum_limiter=&btn_submit¾gin+Search Messages From Last 3 Days: http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?SØ86f18704524b9992bac8164354cd96&SQ=0&t=mnav&rng=3&rng2=0&u?400&forum_limiter=&btn_submit¾gin+Search This Week's Messages: http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?SØ86f18704524b9992bac8164354cd96&SQ=0&t=mnav&rng=7&rng2=0&u?400&forum_limiter=&btn_submit¾gin+Search Yahoo Archive: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs;_ylc=X3oDMTJmMzg0Z3FnBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzI4NjkzODY5BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTYzMjIyNwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2Z2hwBHN0aW1lAzEyNTE4NDE4MDc-