[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: kirby urner <kirby.urner@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 11:12:28 -0700
On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 10:28 AM, swmaerske<SWMirsky@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kirby urner <kirby.urner@...> wrote:
>>
>> > So you think he would have said that there is no point in ever using a
>> > term
>> > like "subjective experience" to differentiate experiences we have that
>> > can
>> > be shared from those that can't?
>> >
>>
>> Careful: subjective experience is easily shared so I'm not sure who's
>> being sloppy here, maybe one of the other interlocutors.
>>
>
> I guess I should ask you the same question then, Kirby:
>
> So you think Wittgenstein would have said there is no point in using a term
> like "subjective experience" to differentiate experiences we have that can
> be shared from those that can't?
>
That may be too specific a question to merit getting out my
Wittgenstein sock puppet and intoning and answer, but the logic does
seem a bit skew.
First of all, "experience" already implies a subject as the grammar is
of "having" experiences i.e. the subject has them. So "subjective
experience" has a redundant ring.
On the other hand, we do have "you had to be there" type experiences
that are difficult to share, especially with people who weren't there.
Experiences are all over the map in terms of their sharability.
But in terms of boiling it all down to: public = sharable, private =
not sharable and then making private = subject, I'd say, no that's a
house of cards, wouldn't last 30 seconds in a real debating situation.
>> > Can you offer something in support of WHY you think as you do, either
>> > some
>> > argument or some direct quotes from him where he said as much?
>> >
>>
>> Very clearly, without my finding that one obscure quote I mentioned
>> (just bought Philosophical Grammar in hopes of finding it), we can say
>> this: there is no pattern or profile in the brain, of neuronic
>> events, corresponding to what we'd call "understanding how to continue
>> a number series".
>>
>
> I don't see how that has much to do with the argument with Cayuse. He is
> maintaining that Wittgenstein would have denied that the idea of "subjective
> experience" had any traction on the grounds that he (Wittgenstein) spoke in
> the PI of a "visual room" (everything we see or are aware of in whatever
> room we're in) vs. any actual room in which we happen to be find ourselves.
>
True, maybe not much relevance. Cayuse seems to have taken the TLP to
heart in some way (as many do), then done what he could to continue
that experience (of revelation, of enlightenment) in the PI. I don't
think it's a gross misreading to Wittgenstein to do that i.e. he was
aware of and loyal to his early interpreters, at least to some of
them, as was more saying: if you appreciated the TLP, then you're
*really* going to like where I go in the PI. And he was right.
> I don't see how referencing patterns or brain profiles or neuronic events
> gets to that.
>
Me neither. I'm hearkening back to Hawkins maybe. If there's
supposed to be signature brain process associated with "understanding"
and if that word "understanding" is to follow our current grammatical
usage patterns even a little... well, I'd say you can't have it both
ways.
>> Why I'd say this is clear is LW goes out of his way, many times, to
>> disabuse us of any notion that "understanding" is any singular mental
>> process, and I'm talking about ordinary usage of the word, not some
>> "special meaning". When I understand what to do, I need not have some
>> specific experience.
>
> Well I think it's fair to say Wittgenstein didn't see it as necessarily
> relating to any mental process but I doubt he would have drawn any
> neuroscientific conclusions about how brains work from that. Two different
> kinds of inquiry are underway here; two different subjects are being
> inquired about.
>
Neuroscientific conclusions about how brains work wouldn't necessarily
have anything to do with an "understanding process" though.
It's like you can dissect a pineal gland and study its chemistry, but
the minute you impute a continuing cogito process or cog-sci theory to
the thing, you've gone over the line from science to scientism, to
Cartesianism in particular, a corner in philosophy where you'll find
precious few loyal fans these days, whereas in his heyday you could
probably sound like Mr. Sophisticated at cocktail parties, yakking
about that silly gland.
Today, it's more the whole brain that's important, not specifics of
neuroanatomy (not like bug brains). You don't have to know much brain
anatomy to join the talking circle, plus we have computer lingo to
boot and just about everyone knows some of that (maybe dabbled in
BASIC), so there's a huge beach area, a sandbox, for a throng a happy
campers and their meaningless fun in the sun (talking about "the
understanding process in the brain" -- a kind of booby prize if they
ever *do* find one, as that'll be proof positive we've become monkeys
at long last, surrendered our minds back to the angels & demons or
whomever).
>> Maybe I do, maybe I don't, but it's not integral
>> to the meaning of understanding that some feeling or occult movement
>> be present or in the works. That's simply grammatically true. Read a
>> bunch of English novels if you don't believe me.
>>
>
> I don't know what you're arguing against by your reference to some "feeling
> or occult movement" equating to "understanding". Who has proposed or argued
> for anything like that?
I got the impression we were supposed to find an understanding process
through introspection and then map that to events in the brain
somehow. Just noting that's bankrupt from the start, never got out of
the starting gate. But if no one is trying to go down that road, then
my staking this sign post ("dead end") should trouble no one here.
>
>> Conclusion: anyone going looking in the brain for "that firing
>> pattern characteristic of the 'understanding' process" has no
>> appreciation for Wittgenstein's contribution whatsoever.
>>
>> Kirby
>>
>
> Again, I'm not sure where you're coming from on this. Perhaps it's the
> header to this thread which has remained the same since it was first
> introduced. In fact, of course, Cayuse and I have been arguing for quite a
> while in this thread about whether one can speak of consciousness in any way
> other than as "the microcosm" or "all" that he thinks Wittgenstein equated
> this concept to in the TLP (and carried on with, albeit more indirectly, in
> the PI) and whether, if one can, my own refusal to do so offers a different
> realm of understanding consciousness, one that is amenable to exploring the
> relation of minds to the organs in our heads called "brains".
Yes, I've got Cayuse pegged as a TLP fan.
The "microcosm" thing is important as per 'The Art of Memory' by Yates
i.e. that "memory palace" or "memory theater" that Gilbert Ryle makes
fun of, as our mental picture of the mind, actually has strong
historic roots in the hermetic tradition. Life imitates art in that
architects would build actual theaters with allusions to the mnemonic
versions used by clerics, public speakers, rhetoricians, orators, to
organize their own heads. Even royalty would commission to have
microcosms built, like bureaus with many little drawers, each with the
thing they were supposed to remember if planning to keep daddy's
estate from falling into the wrong hands or whatever.
In other words, the Microcosm versus Macrocosm lingo (shoptalk) is
still important, and as I was explaining to Josh, we're moving towards
using Theater as more of the core metaphor in computer science, with
scripts driving agents in some event driven object oriented model (of
reality, of knowledge domains -- then mapping back to computer
languages).
> Note that Cayuse's argument hinges on the importance of "subjective
> experience", a dimension of what both he and I call "consciousness" which,
> Cayuse thinks, is totally beyond any ability to reference, describe or
> explain. I deny that that is the case and that the only possible use of the
> term "subjective experience" places it beyond language, while he holds that
> Wittgenstein thought it did.
>
> SWM
I think "subjective experience" is too redundant in most writings. If
an editor, I'd get out my red pen. Just say "experience" if you want
that subjective tinge, that's work already done. "Subjective
experience" sounds lazy to me. What's "objective experience" pray
tell?
Kirby
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