--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote: > > Stuart wrote: > > Cayuse wrote: > >> But the picture we have of such "others" being associated with > >> "subjective experience" is not a matter of behavior, and is > >> therefore non-empirical. As LW says, the picture forces itself > >> upon us, but it has no application. > > > > What "has no application"? His point is that we don't discover > > minds in others by peering inside their heads or by mental telepathy. > > Minds in others just ARE behavior for the purposes of language. > > But we associate that behavior with certain experiential notions > > (as Chalmers later suggests). I don't know that Wittgenstein ever > > dealt with that directly. If he did, I don't recall (though perhaps you > > or someone else here does?). Perhaps you're right that his reference > > to a picture forcing itself on us is to that. (I don't recall the exact > > context of the text you quote from and I'm too lazy to trudge upstairs > > and pull out my PI and look it up -- maybe I will later.) But the fact > > remains that we do make this connection and, while our use of words > > like "mind" in reference to others never depends on seeing into their > > heads, etc., we do come to expect that they have experience that > > is not unlike out own. > > > > When I pulled that fish from the lake I mentioned in an earlier post > > I felt sorry for it because of its desperate struggle to stay alive and > > dropped it back into the water and let it escape. It wasn't language > > that prompted me to do that. I had a deep feeling in my gut of shared > > pain with that fish as I watched it struggle. Perhaps we don't all have > > that or have it to the same degree (certainly many fishermen fish in > > this world and many children stomp on ants, etc.) but it is a picture > > that often forces itself on us. But everytime some of us act on it there > > is, in fact, an application as it were. But the application is NOT to be > > found in how we determine if another has a mind (which, if I recall > > correctly, IS the context of those quotes you cited). > > > I don't dispute that "subjective experience" is imputed to others on grounds > of structural and behavioral criteria. I only dispute that "subjective > experience" is empirical (and therefore a suitable matter for scientific > investigation). > And as I've said before, your use of "subjective experience" simply is not mine as I do not equate it with the "microcosm" or the "all". Indeed, as you yourself have said, such a use as yours has no grammar, no referent. So it is outside of language. Obviously, agreeing with that as I do, I cannot be using it in any discussion here of what it means to have subjective experience, to be a subject. So there's no point in imputing it to me in order to argue against my claim about it being possible to examine its occurrence and manifestations empirically. -- SWM