[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2009 17:31:56 +0100

SWM wrote:

"Cayuse" wrote:

SWM wrote:

If neither subjective nor objective, then what?


The union of both categories.


And what, precisely, is that "union"? Where do we see it? How do we
describe it? What is the referent of the term? I know what's meant by
"union" in relation to American history (the Civil War was fought to
preserve the "Union") and I know what we mean by a union coupling in
the plumbing supply business. I know what it means to form a union of
two people in marriage. And I know that a union is an association of
workers formed to counterbalance an employer, negotiate for those
workers, etc. Presumably the "union" you have in mind isn't that or
any of these other things. So can you say what it actually is?


The /union/ of two sets of elements consists of the set of elements
that is in /either/ set, in contrast to the /intersection/ of two sets of
elements, which consists of the set of elements that is in /both/ sets.



I have no objection to your use of the word 'mind' being identical
to your use of the word 'consciousness', but since I use these terms
differently I will continue to distance my view of consciousness
from use of the word 'mind'.



<snip>

Insofar as you think "consciousness" has nothing to do with "mind",


This comment is not an accurate portrayal of my view. I have never set
forth the view that consciousness has nothing to do with mind, but rather
that the two terms are nebulous enough as it is without compounding
the problem by conflating their use. It is for this reason that I choose
to distance my view of consciousness from use of the word 'mind'.



This means that paricular items arising within the "contents of
consciousness" can be grouped into categories, all such categories
arising /within/ the "contents of consciousness", and so
"consciousness" (the existence of those "contents") transcends any
such categorization.


I think this just shows why it is better to acknowledge
inexpressibility and move on.


That would still leave us with all the BS metaphysics that is grounded in
the objectification of consciousness. Such metaphysics is nonsensical,
including the prevalent belief that the "problem of consciousness" will
eventually fall to the inexorable progress of the scientific enterprise.



The idea of "being a subject", i.e. being something that "has a
point of view", something that "is an experiencer", are all parts of
the "contents of consciousness", the collective entirety of which
/has no sense/.


But I am not talking about the collective entirety in THAT sense,
you are!


You said:
"I was making the point that consciousness involves experience
which means experiencing what we call experiences and that
to be in THAT position is what it means when we speak of
being a subject, i.e., having a point of view, etc."

The "problem of consciousness" (that drives some into BS metaphysics)
is the problem of the relationship between the conceived first-person
experiencer and experiences, or between the third-person experiencer
and the conception of his experiences. Physicalist, idealist, and dualist
approaches to this "problem" all follow hot on the heels of the failure to recognize that the "problem" has no sense. 



If you are identifying this "subject" of yours with that entirety, then
it has no sense. If you are /not/ identifying this "subject" of yours
with that entirety then you must be identifying it with a /part/ of that
"content", and the /existence/ of that "content" cannot be accounted for
in terms of its parts.


Here you do it again! I am talking about the agglomeration of
features, the array of functionalities, we call "mind", or having a
mind, or being a subject, or having consciousness, etc., etc.

If the content, as you call it, is a feature within consciousness as
you have seemed to put it, please note that I am saying something
else entirely, namely that such features are part of what we mean by
the term "consciousness".


I have a suggestion. In his paper "On a confusion about the function
of consciousness" (1995), Ned Block distinguishes between what
he called "access consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness".
Regardless of my conviction that this is too simplistic a distinction,
we could agree that you're interested in a-consciousness and I'm
interested in p-consciousness.



By "first person perspective" I mean being a subject, having
experience.

By "apparently third person world" I mean a world that can be fully
explained in physical terms.


The former has been dealt with above.


Yes, I have hopefully shown you that we can speak of subjectness,
etc., without having to have recourse to the idea of a mysterious,
inexplicable vessel of containment.


This "mysterious, inexplicable vessel of containment" is the source
of your confusion here -- there is no such thing. It is this mistaken
belief that leads to the misguided attempts to provide a physical
account of consciousness.



Regarding the latter, this "third-person world" amounts to the /idea/ of
a subject-independent "reality", that /idea/ arising as part of the
"contents of consciousness".


"Contents" again? Here is the mistake, I think. The word suggests a
container, containment. But that is the wrong picture.


Yes, you would be gravely mistaken to construe the term "contents
of consciousness" on the model of "contents and container".



To take this "third-person world" as the primary datum (in which this
"first-person perspective" now has to be accounted for) is to put the
cart before the horse.


There is no horse if you are right vis a vis "the all".


There is no "third-person world"?
Or there is no "first-person perspective"?

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